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Abraham Lincoln‟s American Indian policy is often overshadowed by the study 
of the American Civil War and this study focuses on Lincoln‟s policy towards the 
American Indian, specifically his involvement in the Dakota War with deciding the fate 
of the condemned Dakota men. The uprising‟s causes are discussed in length as are the 
specific events of the rebellion. The study also looks at how the uprising is remembered 
by white and Dakota population. In addition to secondary books and articles, a large 
amount of newspapers, personal memoirs, and letters are used in the research. 
Photographs, artwork, and monuments are also used. The Dakota War could have been 
avoided if the government had maintained better relations with the Dakota but the Civil 
War further exasperated an already fractured system. Several hundred settlers died at the 
hands of warring Indians and thirty-eight Dakota men were hung for their participation in 
the uprising however for over a century hatred continue to exist between the groups. It is 
only within the last few decades that the Dakota people and Minnesota have come 












Lincoln did not anticipate the challenges that awaited him when he entered office 
in 1861. Not only would he grieve the death of his son, but he faced the moral dilemmas 
of slavery, the problems of westward expansion, and the demanding question of how to 
keep his beloved country united through a bloody civil war. Lincoln matured during his 
four years in office to become the man so many respect and admire. How Lincoln 
handled these crises molded him into more than an intellectual or a talented politician, he 
evolved into a humanitarian who understood the value of human life. An incident on the 
American frontier in late summer 1862, caused Lincoln to divert his attention and the 
Union‟s military resources to Minnesota to put down an Indian rebellion that had claimed 
hundreds of settlers‟ lives. Lincoln‟s decision regarding the rebellion helped define the 
future relationship between the American Indian and the United States‟ government.  
The rebellion highlighted the inherent problems with America‟s Indian 
reservation system. Beginning in the colonial period during the sixteenth century, 
America had struggled over how to deal with the continent‟s indigenous population. 
Colonists originally viewed the American Indian as a potential ally and relied heavily 
upon the Indians to survive in the wilds of North America. The success of early colonial 
settlements often depended on native cooperation. Colonists forged military alliances 
with Indians to win wars with European countries for New World lands. A highly 
profitable fur trade with various Indian nations also brought much wealth to Old World 
coffers.  
Settlers soon indentified radical cultural differences between themselves and the 




physically different. Their lifestyle and culture did not even remotely resemble the 
colonists‟ Western ideology. European empires often defined Indians as savage 
barbarians or heathens that needed to be converted to Christianity and the „proper‟ 
Western lifestyle. Missionaries desperately tried converting the natives, yet many 
American Indians tenaciously clung to their traditional beliefs.  
The American Indian stood in the way of progress for nineteenth century 
Americans. Their nomadic lifestyle served as the main obstacle in expanding the 
American frontier. An empire‟s success depended upon the ability to conquer not only 
the land but the people themselves, the very essence of any civilization. Land needed to 
be civilized, settlers argued and it could not be done without controlling the people. 
Theoretically all savages could be enlightened but the American Indian defied this logic.
1
 
In short manifest destiny could not be fulfilled until American brought Indians to heel.  
Through wars, land sales, and treaties, the American government removed and 
ultimately segregated Indian nations to specific land tracts. Even so, the government 
remained at a loss over what to do with their Indian brethren. Should they be incorporated 
into mainstream white society? If so, how? Should they be kept isolated, removed from 
white settlements until they gradually become extinct, or should efforts at acculturation 
continue? Governmental officials, politicians, missionaries and scientists from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth century, argued over what was the best course. Something 
needed to be done with the vanishing race, but what? American leaders believed that the 
nation could not continue with its westward expansion until all Indian inhabitants were 
displaced off their lands. The very future of American civilization appeared dependent 
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upon this action. The American Indian was a thorn in America‟s side and the country 
desperately wanted the problem solved but did not know how.  
Henry Knox, the Secretary of War under President George Washington, first 
declared that American Indians should be viewed as distinct political entities.  He wrote, 
“The independent nations and tribes of indians ought to be considered as foreign nations, 
not as the subjects of any particular State.”
2
  Knox, in charge of Indian affairs, presented 
his report on Northwestern Indians in June 1789. He concluded Indians should not be 
destroyed for their lands because it would go against the principals of justice which 
America was founded upon. Indians owned the land because they inhabited it first, he 
reasoned because of this America could not simply take it from them. It must be yielded 
by “free consent” or as spoils of war as fair punishment. Knox proposed that the 
government gain Indian lands though a series of treaties which satisfied Indian demands, 
if at all possible. He viewed Indians as “ignorant” in his report, but insisted their opinions 
be both heard and considered. Knox assumed that as white settlements encroached upon 
Indian lands, the subsequent loss of game and decreased land value to Indian life, would 
force Indians to sell even more of their property. This would lead to the natural demise of 
the American Indian and the growth of America‟s power.
3
 Prior to Knox‟s report, 
Congress appropriated specific funding for Indian land sales. The British began this 
practice and Congress perceived it to be the best option in expanding America‟s frontier.
4
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Indian Affairs underwent a dramatic change during the presidency of Andrew 
Jackson. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 granted the president the right to remove 
Eastern Indian nations to Western land tracts set aside by the government. These 
designated lands would always belong, in theory, to the assigned Indian nations. The 
government would not only protect American Indians on these lands, but the government 
would also provide annuities and supplies for them. Of course the Indians would have to 
agree through a treaty first before being removed from their tribal lands.
5
  The Removal 
Act mainly affected the Five “Civilized” Tribes in the American Southeast.  
The Seminole, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Cherokee Nations, all resisted 
assimilation into American society. They participated in American society but kept as 
much of their tribal lands and traditional beliefs as possible while respecting American 
laws. Members of the Five “Civilized” Tribes were often successful planters. Some lived 
as westerners but remained proud of their Indian heritage. Eventually representatives of 
all five of the “Civilized” Tribes signed the Removal Act, and in the following years were 
removed to Oklahoma on government lands. The most famous removal was the Trail of 
Tears in 1838 when the government forced the Cherokee Nation west. Thousands died in 
the horrific march due to the lack of supplies, and gruesome conditions. The Seminoles in 
Florida resisted removal for several decades with a series of three wars, the Seminole 
Wars, against the United States army. Some Indians did move west, but ultimately the 
state of Florida accepted the presence of the Seminole Nation and legally acknowledged 
them.  
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The reservation system was created in 1851 with the Indian Appropriation Act. 
By then it was clear the American Indian would not quietly disappear into the pages of 
history books. They would not willingly cede land ownership to the American 
government. Indians stood in the way of westward expansion. America could not move 
forward until they assimilated the Indians in to American society and progress claimed 
the lands. Many believed that only as citizens did American Indians have a place in the 
future of the United States. Either the Indian must become a citizen and a productive 
member of society, or he needed to be physically exterminated. One needed to kill the 
Indian to save the man. As explained by Harvey Roy Pearce, the death of the American 
Indian is the “price of progress of civilization over savagism.”
6
 
The Appropriation Act concentrated American Indians in specific areas known as 
reservations. Indians were not allowed to freely leave the enclosed encampments. The 
hope was that reservations would not only protect Indians from white settlers but would 
allow Indians to be slowly assimilated into U.S. society by the work of missionaries and 
government appointed agents. Indians, they believed, could learn how to farm while 
adopting a Christian lifestyle and thus they were no longer essentially Indian. Indians 
resisted the proposed reservation system. They had no religious or cultural connection to 
the land given to them. The lands were often poor and unfit for farming. Settlers 
frequently encroached upon the choice pieces of the lands, pushing out the Indian 
inhabitants. Disease, starvation and death further plagued reservations.  
The Indian agent would be the crucial tie between the Indians on the reservation 
and the government. Cultural go-betweens served as early versions of Indian agents in the 
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colonial period, acting as mediators and interpreters. As American Indian policy evolved, 
cultural go-betweens were replaced by what Knox referred to as “missionaries of 
excellent moral character.” In a letter to George Washington in July 1789, Knox 
described the ideal Indian agent and their duties. These “missionaries” would live among 
a specific nation. They would be knowledgeable of animal husbandry and farming. Knox 
believed commanding officers should be given first consideration for the position. He 
saw the agents as “the instruments to work on the Indians.” They would not be interested 
in profiting off the Indians, rather they would be a paternalistic friend, helping the Indians 
acclimate to contemporary American culture. Knox believed that the “missionaries” 
would “attach them to the Interests of the United States.” Gift giving and meeting Indian 
requests would greatly help this process. Under no circumstances should Indians give 
presents to agents in return. Knox believed the process would be less expensive than 
forcibly removing or destroying the Indians as he hoped it would benefit all involved 
parties. Knox stressed that at all times the Indians should be treated with respect “in the 
most friendly and just manner.”
7
 
The reality of Indian agent system was the exact opposite of what Knox foresaw. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs was created in 1824 under the control of the War 
Department and the responsibility was later given to the Department of the Interior in 
1849. As explained by Donald Chaput, corruption always existed in Indian Affairs but it 
increased greatly under the control of the Department of the Interior. The “Indian ring” as 
Chaput called it, benefited everyone but the Indian. A politician appointed the agent, 
usually a friend or political ally. The agent would then choose a trader to serve the 
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Indians on the reservation. Far from the government‟s eye, the agent and trader would 
charge outlandish prices for goods, accepting credit on future annuity payments given to 
the Indians by the government, and often pocketed the difference.
8
 
Agents were mostly civilians with no qualifications for the job. They did not 
speak the native language, or care about assimilating the Indians. These patronage 
appointees cared only about profiting from their new position. The agent and his family 
lived on the reservation in a government supplied home. Agents acted as both a 
supervisor to the reservation and as a patriarchal figure to the Indians, at least 
theoretically. They kept track of all the Indians on the reservation, settled disputes when 
needed, ordered supplies, kept records of monies spent, and the Indians‟ progress towards 
Westernization. Their primary duty was handing out yearly supplies and annuity 
payments. This position was not work intensive nor did it require any level of skill. It was 
a boon to receive the appointment with many agents retiring after four years, pockets 
lined with emblemized funds.
9
 
Bishop Henry Benjamin Whipple, Minnesota‟s first Episcopalian Bishop, 
complained to President Abraham Lincoln that the Indian agents were “generally selected 
without any reference to their fitness for the place.” Whipple said that even the most 
honest men who had good intentions upon receiving their position, sooner or later fell 
prey to the system‟s inherent corruption. Lincoln agreed with Whipple that something 
needed to be done with the problematic Indian agents but with the Civil War occupying 
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most government efforts, little could be done. Decent Indian agents did exist but those 
men were grossly outnumbered by the dishonesty of others.
10
 
Meanwhile the Indians lived in a constant state of debt and impoverished living 
conditions. Many Indians turned to alcohol.
11
 Malnutrition and hunger also proved a 
problem for many Indian families. Domestic violence was also a problem, not only from 
male family members but from traders as well. Indians depended upon traders and the 
yearly government supplies to survive, since they could no longer live off the land or 
hunt buffalo herds. Seemingly the reservation system benefited everyone but the Indian. 
The reservations were created as the country went along, with little thought given to 
details or the system‟s future. The reservation system served as an instant, if unsuccessful 
fix to a much larger problem. Despite two-hundred and fifty years of engagement, 
America still did not know what to do with the Indians. The Civil War made the situation 
much worse. Funds and supplies were lessened or delayed. Soldiers were called away to 
fight in the eastern campaigns, leaving the West vulnerable to possible Indian rebellions. 
Lincoln entered his presidency with little knowledge of American Indians. His 
personal experience was limited to family history and his own participation in the Black 
Hawk War in 1832. Lincoln‟s namesake, his grandfather Abraham Lincoln, died during 
an Indian raid on the Kentucky frontier in 1786. The Lincoln family had recently settled 
in Kentucky when Indians came upon Abraham and his three sons, Josiah, Mordecai, and 
Thomas (Lincoln‟s father), in the corn fields. Abraham died instantly. Josiah ran for help 
while Mordecai took shelter in a nearby cabin. Thomas, only six years old, stayed with 
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his dead father. He would have been killed as well if not for Mordecai‟s quick aim at an 
Indian who crept up behind the grieving boy. Thomas later swore he heard the bullet 
enter the Indian . He repeated this story numerous times to his son. Lincoln admitted “the 
legend more strongly than all others imprinted upon my mind and memory.”
12
 
Lincoln did not personally interact with an Indian until he served as a soldier in 
the Black Hawk War. He volunteered for service with the Illinois militia in 1832 and was 
chosen to be captain of the local company despite having no prior military experience. 
One day, an Indian wandered into his company‟s camp, hungry and poorly clothed. He 
carried a letter of recommendation to General Lewis Cass, suggesting his services as a 
guide. The soldiers wanted to hang the Indian as a spy simply because of his ethnicity but 
Lincoln protested. He saw no reason to kill the harmless, innocent Indian. A few of the 
soldiers accused Lincoln of cowardice. He replied “If any man thinks I am a coward, let 
him test it!” No one challenged him and the Indian remained unharmed.
13
 Clearly Lincoln 
felt no racial hatred towards Indians despite knowing his grandfather died from an 
unprovoked Indian attack.  
 Lincoln saw no direct combat with Indian units but he thoroughly enjoyed his 
time spent in the militia. He helped bury the dead after Stillman‟s defeat in May 1832 
when a Black Hawk party ambushed the unsuspecting soldiers. The attacking Indians 
grossly outnumbered the soldiers at Sycamore Creek in Illinois.Lincoln revealed in a 
1859 letter to J.W. Fell that his time as captain “gave me more pleasure than any I have 
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 He witnessed firsthand the brutality that Indians were capable of but that did 
not prevent Lincoln from showing them kindness.  
He spent his early years on the American frontier where he shared a cabin with 
his parents and siblings. Thomas Lincoln, his father, relied on young Abraham‟s help 
with the farm. When his father could spare him, Lincoln attended a local school at his 
mother‟s insistence. The Lincoln family possessed little wealth or prestige on the frontier. 
These humble beginnings shaped Lincoln to be more than “a man of the West” as his 
1860 presidential campaign advertised.
15
 More than anything Lincoln wanted what was 
best for his country. Unfortunately the American Civil War demanded all of his attention 
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Lincoln‟s presidency did not give him many more opportunities to interact with 
America‟s Indians. Yearly Indian delegates arrived in Washington D.C for meetings 
however Lincoln met with only a few. William Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
and Lincoln‟s secretaries, John Hay and John Nicolay, formally received the delegates. 
Lincoln‟s subordinates were in charge of impressing upon the visiting Indians the power 
of the United States. Not only did the delegates tour the city but they received gifts such 
as new clothing and peace medals. Few records were kept of Lincoln‟s private meetings 
with Indian leaders but his secretary John Hay wrote occasional notes. Hay recorded an 
1861 account of Lincoln‟s meeting with the Potawatomi Indians. It revealed that Lincoln 
knew little of American Indian culture. He greeted them with what Indian words he knew 
and spoke with them in broken English. Lincoln assumed all Indians shared the same 
language and did not understand the English language.
16
 He may have recognized them 
as humans but he did not understand them as people. Lincoln lacked the necessary 
knowledge and experience to do so.  
The photograph below shows a Dakota delegation from 1858 in Washington D.C., 
which includes Mankato, an Indian leader, who later participated in the uprising and died 
in one of the last battles. Mankato is sitting in the first row on the left. Three of the 
Dakota men proudly display large fans they were no doubt given on the trip as part of the 
gifting tradition. Several of the white men in the photograph have their hands placed on 
the shoulders of the Indians, promoting the sense of brotherhood and peace between the 
two groups. It is difficult to believe that only a few years after this photograph was taken, 
war erupted between the Dakota and Minnesotan settlers. 
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The Civil War further ensured Lincoln‟s limited involvement with Indian affairs. 
Once more he delegated what duties he could so he could focus on the war in the South. 
Lincoln cared about the American Indian only in the larger context of the Civil War. He 
relied heavily upon the Office of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior. Lincoln 
perceived the flawed reservation system to be the only solution to the problem. Lincoln 
hoped the system would hold during the duration of the war so needed supplies could go 
to the armies, and settlers could continue to populate the western territories. The existing 
Indian system was one of corruption and inefficiency with Indian agents receiving low 
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One Indian rebellion caught the attention of Lincoln. In the fall of 1862, the lower 
Dakota Nation declared war on Minnesotan settlers. Panic quickly spread throughout 
Minnesota into Iowa and Nebraska. People feared an all out war as they learned of the 
atrocities committed by the attacking Dakota on the American frontier. Lincoln could not 
afford any significant diversion of military attention and needed war material. He sent 
disgraced General John Pope to end the armed conflict quickly. The subsequent military 
trials sentenced three hundred Dakota men to death for their participation or association 
in the uprising. Lincoln‟s philanthropic nature could not allow such a mass execution. 
After a close examination of the trial records Lincoln found thirty eight men deserving of 
the death penalty. The rest he pardoned all together or directed to serve shortened prison 
sentences.  
 During the Civil War Indians saw their own chance to change the system and they 
took it. Not only did the rebellion highlight the culmination of factors which fissured the 
Indian reservation system, but it changed how the government handled Indian affairs. 
Prior to this the American Indian was not a dominant or pressing factor in Lincoln‟s 
consciousness. The president wanted the rebellion resolved as soon as possible for the 
uprising took away valuable time and resources from the Civil War. No longer could the 
government ignore the faulty system. Reforms to the Office of Indian Affairs occurred 
decades later because of the attention created by the rebellion. The Dakota War forced 
Lincoln to become personally involved in the lives of three hundred and eight Dakota 
men and within the Indian system itself.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             

















Taken on August 21, 1862, the photograph featured above is the only picture 
taken during the Dakota War. The men, women, and children in the photograph fled their 
homes surrounding the Dakota reservation in fear that they too would meet a gruesome 
death as so many of their fellow Minnesotans had at the hands of Indians. Adrain J. Ebell, 
one of the refugees, took the photograph. Families fled in haste, taking only what could 
be carried. The group‟s somber expression portrays the nightmare they lived for several 
weeks in August until General Henry Hastings Sibley and General John Pope gained 
control of the frontier.  
 It is impossible to know how many settlers died in the uprising as the Dakota 
warriors killed indiscriminately. Defenseless women and children were not spared and 
many were taken captive. Even those with Indian blood feared for their lives as the dark 
complexioned man in the photograph demonstrates. The trial records of the Dakota men 
who faced charges for the uprising, repeatedly claimed they participated only because 




frontier for forty days. Newspaper articles from the time claimed an unbelievable number 
perished on the frontier but admitted that many of the assumed dead probably fled for 
their lives without sending word.
18
 Conservative estimates were that several hundred died 
but some historians believe the number could be in the thousands. They argue that so 
many died in insolated cabins or remote woods where the remains could not be 
recovered, so there was no record or surviving memory.  
 Survivors no doubt exaggerated details of the atrocities committed for romantic 
excitement. The more lurid accounts tell of the Dakota torturing and mutilating the 
bodies, beyond a simple scalping. Reportedly, one woman‟s baby was snatched from her 
womb, and nailed to a tree. Women claimed repeated rapes and people swore the Indians 
burned some settlers alive. The New York Times described roads lined with bodies, and 
blood trails, and make-shift infirmaries filled with survivors suffering from horrific knife 
wounds.
19
 Rumors like that fueled the ensuing terror. Settlers only knew that the Dakota 
spared very few. Ransacked homesteads and towns smoldered as settlers fled for their 
lives.  
 The settlers maintained hope for victory, as demonstrated by the small group of 
men raising a hatchet in the photograph. Governor Alexander Ramsey sent General 
Sibley to put down the rebellion, and Lincoln later dispatched General Pope after the 
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incident gained national attention. Divisions among the Dakota enabled the Union army 
to finally defeat the Indians, but not before many settlers lost their lives and the future of 
the Dakota Nation was irrevocably changed. The Dakota‟s anger began with America‟s 
flawed reservation system but was deeply rooted in the preceding decade of the tribe‟s 
history.  
 By 1851the lands of the Dakota had greatly diminished with the settlers‟ arrival. 
Game had become scarce and providing for themselves was almost impossible. They 
could no longer survive on bison and small game alone. The Dakota were eager to sell 
their lands to the government in exchange for promised care and the United States 
government was too happy to oblige. In July 1851the Upper Dakota tribes of Minnesota 
met with Governor Ramsey and signed the Traverse des Sioux treaty.
20
 The featured 
painting by Frank Barnell Mayer in the early 1880s demonstrated how eager the Dakota 
were for the treaty. He depicted the men, women, and children gathered to witness the 
signing, peaceful and supportive of the decision. 
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 Philander Prescott, Indian agent to the Dakota at the time of the treaty, claimed 
the exact opposite. It took over twenty days to convince the Dakota to sign. They thought 
the treaty took too much of their land and believed that they were not adequately 
represented at the negotiations. Pressured and wooed with feasts and gifts, the Dakota 
finally agreed. They received “fine coats” according to Prescott, horses, saddles, blankets, 
knives, tobacco, ribbons, and paint for their cooperation. Games were also played, 
physical competitions with medals given to the winners. Ironically the cost of the treaty 
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The Indian leaders ceded their land claims from Lake Travers, to the Big Sioux 
River, and to the Red River of Northern Minnesota in exchange for a small reservation 
along the Minnesota River. The highlighted border in the accompanying map shows the 
amount of land the Dakota sold. The Dakota received $1,665,000 for their lands but the 
government held $1,360,000 in trust, payable over the next fifty years with a 5 percent 
interest rate. A portion of the money would be placed towards educating the Dakota and 
helping them become „civilized‟. The government set aside $275,000 of the profits for 
relocating the Dakota to the new reservation.
22
  
The Dakota would still have been left with a large profit from the treaty but much 
of the monies went towards debts traders claimed the Indians owed them. The traders 
claimed some $250,000 worth of promissory notes. Originally the amount was much 
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higher at over $400,000 but the traders agreed to a lower debt. They padded the amounts 
owed to them to an outrageous amount. It was impossible to disprove their sums. Much 
of the pressure the Dakota felt to sign the treaty came from the traders as they only got 
paid if the treaty occurred. It is debatable if the Dakota leaders knew what they were 
signing as the traders pushed what is now known as the “traders‟ papers” in front of the 
Indians after they had signed the main treaty. The leaders claimed they thought the papers 
were copies of the treaty; they did not realize what they were signing. The traders‟ money 
was deducted from the relocation sum the Dakota received, which greatly affected their 
future. It is not farfetched to assume that without the treaty, the Dakota might not have 
felt desperate enough to wage war against the settlers in the summer of 1862.
23
 Not only 
had they lost much of their traditional lands, but they felt cheated out of the money owed 
to them by the government. 
 Not all the Dakota agreed with the Traverse des Sioux treaty or with the move to 
the reservation. Inkpaduta, a Dakota leader who refused to participate in the treaty, 
separated from the main Dakota Nation as a result. In early March 1857, Inkpaduta went 
to the reservation seeking provisions as hunting was scarce from the previous hard 
winter. Charles E. Flandrau, the Indian agent to the Dakota at the time, refused and sent 
Inkpaduta away. Hungry and upset, Inkpaduta and his warriors attacked a series of 
isolated homesteads on March 7
th
, 1857 near Spirit Lake in Iowa. Over thirty settlers 
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were killed in what is now known as the Spirit Lake Massacre. The renegade Dakota took 
one captive Abbie Gardner.
24
  
 A young girl at the time, Abbie remembered Inkpaduta and his men arriving at 
her family‟s cabin near breakfast time, asking for food. Her family eagerly fed the hungry 
Indians but refused to give them ammunition. The Indians later returned, demanding 
more supplies, this time flour, which was a rarity on the frontier. When Abbie‟s father 
refused the Indians shot him. They destroyed the Gardner homestead, ransacking it for 
supplies and burning the cabin. The Indians killed all of the Gardner family, even the 
children but spared Abbie as a captive. Abbie remembered her young siblings being taken 
from her arms and beaten “to death with sticks of stove wood.” The Indians attacked the 
surrounding homesteads before attacking several more settlers in Springfield Minnesota. 
Flandrau caught up with Inkpaduta in late June and freed young Abbie, but the raiding 
Dakota did not receive any punishment other than a suspension of their government 
annuities until September. Inkpaduta‟s attack years earlier, is frighteningly similar to the 
events of the Dakota War, hunger and helplessness led to a violent uprising. 
Retrospectively the Dakota War might have been negated if the government had punished 
Inkpaduta and his men more harshly in 1857 or acknowledged the Dakota‟s growing 
desperation. Fear spread on the Minnesota frontier of future Indian attacks but no one 
predicted the bloodbath of the Dakota war a few short years later in 1862.
25
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 The situation had not changed much for the Dakota by 1862. If anything, it had 
gotten worse with the onset of the Civil War. Over six thousand Dakota depended on the 
government for provisions and even then, it barely offset the lack of game. The Dakota 
tried agriculture but suffered from droughts and floods that greatly hindered any progress 
towards being self sufficient. When Philander Prescott retired from his position in 1856, 
he and fellow Indian agent, Richard G. Murphy, predicted the Dakota would never be 
„civilized‟ “unless a different system is pursued.”
26
  
 The photograph featured below is of a Dakota man, Chaska, and his family. 
Chaska, one of the Indians who reportedly helped whites during the uprising, lived as a 
„civilized‟ Indian, a “cut hair.” He and his family dressed in white clothing and kept 
white hair styles, as shown in the photograph. Although not indicated in the photograph, 
the family no doubt adopted the Christian faith as well. The family most likely inhabited 
the simple brick home in the back of the scene, and did their cooking in the open fire pit 
in front of the house. The corn field to the right suggests the family also had mild success 
with agriculture. Chaska‟s family was not wealthy by any means; however, they 
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Yearly annuities were late once again in 1862, mostly because of the war, and the 
Indians still had not received payment for selling their land in the Traverse des Sioux 
treaty. The education fund remained mostly untouched. Traders agreed amongst 
themselves to refuse the Indians credit for any more supplies, as they only received 
payment if and when the annuities were paid, and they doubted if the money would 
come. One trader, Andrew J. Myrick demonstrated the contempt of many whites with his 
statement, “if they are hungry, let them eat grass.” Starvation was a real fear for the 
Dakota Nation. Over four thousand Indians went to their assigned agent, Thomas 
Galbraith, in mid July for provisions only to be told no, even though the storehouse had 
supplies. He promised the payments would come soon and then he would disperse the 
goods as he did not want to deal with the hassle more than once. Galbraith was grossly 








 For several weeks Galbraith handed out the minimum amount of supplies to the 
waiting Indians who stayed hoping for the annuity to arrive. On August 4, 1862 a few 
Dakota men became tired of waiting and broke into the warehouse for needed supplies. 
Stephen Riggs, missionary to the Dakota, said they broke into the warehouse with axes, 
carrying out bacon and flour. Lieutenant Timothy J. Sheehan managed to bring the 
Indians under control with the threat of a howitzer although tempers still flared high. The 
Indians agreed to pay for the damaged door out of their annuity payment when it arrived, 
and Galbraith gave them more supplies under the condition that the Indians leave 
immediately, which they were only too happy to do. Galbraith promised to summon them 
when the payments arrived.
28
 The Indians received no punishment for breaking into the 
warehouse.  
 This was a tenuous peace at best. The Dakota wanted their promised monies and 
provisions, but Galbraith could not tell the Indians when they would arrive or if they even 
would. Traders continued to refuse to give them credit which only worsened the situation. 
Indians had a very fragile trust with the government, particularly the Dakota who felt 
trapped and out of options. Rumors spread quickly that the monies would never come. 
The storehouse incident demonstrated just how desperate the Dakota felt. No longer were 
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they content to wait for others to decide their fate. The Dakota‟s distress and impatience 
rose with August‟s heat.  
 A series of events occurred on Sunday August 17
th
 that forever changed the 
relationship between Minnesotans and the Dakota. Four young Indian men near Acton, 
Minnesota found a nest of eggs near a farmer‟s fence while they scavenged for food. 
Little Crow, Chief of the Dakota, later identified the men as Brown Wing, Breaking Up, 
Killing Ghost, and Runs-Against-Something-When-Crawling, all part of the Rice Creek 
band which the Dakota often viewed as troublemakers. The men hesitated in eating the 
eggs, even though they were hungry because the eggs belonged to a white man. Each 
dared the other to eat an egg although no one was brave enough to do so. One man broke 
the eggs and proclaimed he was not a coward. “I am not afraid of the white man,” he said 
and vowed to kill the farmer to prove it. The other men agreed that they would “be brave 
too” and went to the homestead. The four men killed Mr. and Mrs. Jones, their adoptive 
fifteen year old daughter Clara, and two men who had the misfortune of visiting the Jones 
that day, Mr. Webster and Mr. Baker. Their wives were left unharmed and quickly fled to 
the nearest homestead to raise the alarm. The Indians also spared Clara‟s eighteen month 




The Dakota men had not planned to kill anyone that day. An act of passion caused 
things to spiral out of hand; no larger plot existed. The “Soldiers‟ Lodge”, a secret 
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council of Dakota leaders, which met in June 1862, never mentioned going to war. They 
only decided to prevent traders from being present when the annuities were doled out. 
The four men quickly returned to their Rice Creek village, fearful of the repercussions for 
killing the whites without provocation. Their own band was eager to declare war on the 
whites, but knew such a thing would not be possible without the support of all the Dakota 
bands. Red Middle Voice, leader of the Rice Creek Village, consulted Shakopee, leader 
of a larger band located up the river. Both villages wanted war. They called a chief‟s 
council late Sunday night at the home of Little Crow, the unofficial chief of the Dakota 
Nation. Red Middle Voice said that “Little Crow is the greatest among chiefs…Where he 
leads all others will follow.” Little Crow was indeed the most respected chief among the 




 Between the hours of midnight and dawn, the Dakotas debated what to do. Band 
leaders crowded into Little Crow‟s home, while the young men anxiously waited outside, 
eager to go to war. The majority wanted the fight. Traveling Hail, another Dakota learder, 
warned that such a war would be folly as the Dakota possessed little ammunition. He 
asserted they would be greatly outnumbered by the whites who had a tremendous supply 
of guns and cannons. No one heeded his warnings as the young men outside howled for 
war. Little Crow was against going to war, but he decided he must support the wishes of 
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his people. It was as Red Middle Voice said, the men wanted war and would have it, even 
if it meant going against the chief‟s decision.
31
 
 Little Crow wanted what was best for his people. During the council meeting he 
called them “children and fools” for suggesting a war against whites, such a thing would 
be “madness.” Leaders needed to be the sage parent and not yield to popular demands if 
it was not best for the tribe. Red Middle Voice accused Little Crow of being a coward for 
not wanting to kill the whites. This angered him greatly. Little Crow delivered an 




 Little Crow claimed the men did not know what they were asking but that he did. 
Little Crow had fought the whites and the Ojibwas before. He had the scalps to prove that 
he was not a coward. His people were like dogs in heat Little Crow said and that they 
were drunk on “the white man‟s devil water.” The Dakota were not powerful as before. 
The whites were like locusts, no matter how many died, more would come with guns. 
Little Crow said they could count on their fingers all day and still would not be able to 
keep count of how many whites would arrive for war. If the Dakota went to war, the 
whites would turn on them, and “devour you and your women and little children.” Little 
Crow predicted his people would die like “rabbits when the hungry wolves hunt them in 
the Hard Moon” if they warred against the whites. His people were in blood lust and did 
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not understand reason. Still, Little Crow agreed to declare war against the Minnesotans; 
he said, “Little Crow is not a coward: he will die with you.”
33
 
 The fateful decision had been made. It is unknown who issued the order for 
American Indians did not keep written records, and reporters recorded their oral histories 
years after the fact, but the Dakota vowed to kill all whites and any Indian or “cut hair” 
who would not join the cause. Before the council dispersed, Little Crow ordered an attack 
on the Lower Agency that morning, Monday August 18. Big Eagle, a chief present at the 
council who opposed the war for the same reasons as Little Crow, recalled that the men 
formed raiding parties to attack the unsuspecting settlers that night: “Parties formed and 
dashed away in the darkness to kill the settlers. The women began to run bullets and the 
men to clean their guns.”
34
 
 Historians have since wondered why Little Crow changed his mind. Surely a 
leader would not make a rash decision based upon peer pressure. Some believe he wanted 
to regain popularity among his people. Earlier that spring the Dakota elected Traveling 
Hail, a farmer Indian, as their main speaker. This selection humbled the proud Dakota 
leader. When the council came to him that night in August, Little Crow told them to go to 
their elected speaker as it was not his place to decide for the tribe. He might have agreed 
to the war in order to win over his people and to prove his fidelity to the Dakota. He did 
not want to lose any more status within his nation.
35
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Little Crow had always favored assimilation as demonstrated in the above 
photograph of the chief dressed as a white person. Born in ca. 1810, he attended a 
missionary school as an adult where he learned not only how to read and write in English 
but in the Dakota language as well. Little Crow frequently served as the spokesperson for 
newspaper interviews, reservation business, and as a Washington D.C. delegate. He 
adopted the western style of dress, frequently wearing trousers and linen shirts; however, 
for Dakota ceremonies he wore traditional dress. Little Crow lived in a two story brick 
home built for him by Galbraith but he kept his four wives and continued to practice the 
traditional ways of his people. Eventually he converted to the Episcopal faith; he cut his 
hair to shoulder length, and began to more fully live as a white man would. Little Crow 
did his best to combine elements of both the Dakota and the western life style to represent 
the easiest way for his people to assimilate into American society. When they elected 
Traveling Hail as their speaker, he felt deceived and rejected. His path straddling both 




assimilated and not in the manner he advocated.
36
 All this quickly changed in August 
when the Dakota advocated war before Little Crow. They believed they could no longer 
trust the American government and wanted to return to their traditional ways, with the 
















 The Dakota had nothing to lose and much to gain if the war went in their favor. 
Considerable hatred existed on both sides and the Dakota way of life appeared to be 
rapidly disappearing with the onslaught of white settlers. Many wondered if it would it be 
better to die in the way of their ancestors, in battle with their enemies, or quietly 
disappear into the white world? Regardless of what the council or Little Crow decided, 
the Dakota would receive retribution for that morning‟s attack on the homesteads. Whites 
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would not over look the death of innocent women. Red Middle Voice suggested in the 
now famous council meeting, that the Dakota had no choice other than war because the 
government would demand blood retribution for the attack.
37
  
 The timing for such a war was perfect. As Red Middle Voice stated in the council, 
most of the soldiers in Minnesota had gone east with the onset of the Civil War. To 
satisfy Minnesota‟s quota from Congress‟ draft in July 1862, all able body men needed to 
enlist. Indian agencies struggled to fill the abandoned positions and to continue protecting 
the reservations with military personel. There was a visible lack of U.S. manpower. At 
the time of the attack, Galbraith had left the reservation with his band of volunteer 
militia, the Renville Rangers, to train at Fort Snelling, leaving the Dakota further 
unsupervised. Indians knew of the Civil War from newspapers and hearing gossip from 
the white settlers and traders. Big Eagle claimed the Indians believed “the North would 
be whipped” in the war against the South as the Union had recently suffered a trouncing 
defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Some Indians feared they would become slaves 
if the Confederacy won.
38
 If the Dakota were to successfully rise against the whites, the 
time would be now, when the Union was at its weakest.  
 After all, Inkpaduta had already challenged the power of the Union with few 
consequences, they themselves had broken down a warehouse door without punishment, 
and the southern states had, seemingly, successfully withdrawn from the Union. Why 
could not the Dakota kill all white settlers and reclaim their lands? Several Dakota 
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leaders hoped the British would honor their earlier promise to Little Crow from the War 
of 1812, to help the Indians defeat the American settlers if needed. Little Crow thought it 
would be a folly as much had changed in the following five decades but still, the hope 
was there. Britain had long lost interest in claiming the western territories by that point 
and wanted nothing to do with American politics. They also did not want to deal with 
their own Indian uprising if the Dakota decided to attack within Canadian borders as 
well.
39
 When the Dakota declared war on the whites, they did so without Britain‟s aide 
and without the support of the Lower Dakota or any other Indian nation.  
 There may have been truth in missionary Stephen Rigg‟s statement that without 
the Civil War “there would have been no Dakota uprising and no Minnesota massacres.” 
The “massacres” began with an attack on the Lower Agency early Monday morning that 
promised more bloody violence for all the remaining settlers on the Minnesota frontier. 
Philander Prescott and trader Andrew J. Myrick, who told the Indians to eat grass, were 
among the first to die. Myrick died trying to escape. The Indians had stuffed grass into 
his mouth. His brother found his body two weeks later, full of bullet holes, arrows, and an 
embedded scythe. Gold coins lay nearby. Two other storeclerks who died, James W. 
Lynd and G.W. Divoll, were also found with gold stuffed in their mouths.
40
 
 It is remarkable that only thirteen people died in the original attack on the Lower 
Agency considering the settlers received very little warning ahead of time. The attack 
began around six in the morning and by noon the town was destroyed. Traders and store 
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personnel were the main target, however, the agency‟s physician, Dr. Philander 
Humphrey, and his family also died. His son witnessed his father‟s throat being cut and 
his head being severed. Seven more people died trying to escape and ten were captured. 
The Indians became distracted with looting and burning the settlement which allowed 
many inhabitants to slip away. Nearly fifty settlers were able to escape to safety by 
crossing the Minnesota River at the Redwood Ferry. An unknown ferryman risked his 
own life to get many to safety before the Dakota murdered him. Raiding parties 
discovered the ferryman and grossly dismembered his body as punishment for helping 
settlers escape. Riggs said that the death of the ferryman made escape extremely difficult 




 The New York Times reported that the Monday evening of the attack “the light 
from burning buildings and grain sacks was seen in all directions.”
42
 The refugees fled 
thirteen miles to Fort Ridgely. Captain Marsh believed the incident to be nothing more 
than an isolated occurrence and set out with forty-six men to settle the dispute. The men 
unknowingly walked into an ambush at the ferry despite the warnings of refugees they 
met in route. Twenty-four U.S. soldiers were killed, including their mixed blood 
interpreter, Peter Quinn. Marsh drowned in the river as he tried to escape. Reportedly 
only one Indian died in the ambush. Clearly this was not a simple misunderstanding as 
Captain Marsh had thought. Sergeant John Bishop led the survivors back to Fort Ridgely, 
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arriving after nightfall. Word quickly traveled to Galbraith and to Fort Ripley of the 
events. Union soldiers and volunteer militia units grouped together to offer what 
protection they could against the warring Dakota.
43
 
The success at the Redwood Ferry and at the Lower Agency gave further 
confidence to the Dakota. Perhaps they could successfully beat the whites and reclaim 
their lands. Filled with blood lust, many of the warriors dispersed to raid homesteads, 
eager to loot and to unleash more violence on unsuspecting families. The Dakota warriors 
would not attempt another group attack until August 19 when they attacked a nearby 
town, New Ulm. This allowed the Union army and settlers time to organize against the 
Dakota. Little Crow warned his men that they needed to act quickly but they were too 
drunk with their temporary victories to heed his advice.
44
  
Mrs. DeCamp, a woman who survived the first attack on the agency, claimed to 
have asked some of the warriors why they killed innocents. They said that it was “fun to 
kill white men” and that “One Indian can kill ten white men without trying.” The Dakota 
men called the whites cowards since they had left their women unprotected when they 
left to fight in the East. In the words of one author, Meridel Le Sueur, “the Indians had 
gone berserk…They had gone mad with hunger and vengeance.” Little Crow may have 
warned his people not to kill women or children, to target only the traders and those 
guilty of cheating them, but the Dakota quickly forgot to distinguish their victims and 
killed all whites they encountered on the Minnesota frontier. 
45
 
                                                          
43
 Carley, The Dakota War, 15-16; Babcock, “Minnesota‟s Indian War, 96; Riggs, Mary and I, 153.  
 
44
 Carley, The Dakota War, 16; Babcock, “Minnesota‟s Indian War, 96. 
 
45





For the Dakota it was simply another war against their enemies, similar to the 
wars they previously fought against their long time foes the Chippewa and Ojibwas. It 
did not matter if they killed men or children as they wanted revenge and to eradicate all 
whites from their lands, and those who did not die would flee for their lives in fear of the 
atrocities. Either way their goal would be accomplished. Riggs, who lamented the loss of 
progress he had made with the Dakota, was entirely correct in his recollection that “the 




 Not all the Dakota supported the uprising or the mass murders of so many 
innocent victims, but unfortunately there was little that could be done. All Indians would 
receive blame for the carnage regardless if they participated or not, as the later war trials 
demonstrated. Even the Dakota leaders could not control their men.  For the first week 
the Dakota were on the offensive, but they soon went on the defensive as the Union 
forces against them grew. Little Crow and other leaders wanted to take Fort Ridgely 
immediately after attacking the agency, but the younger warriors wanted to loot the 
nearby town of New Ulm. The Dakota attacked New Ulm twice, first on August 19 and 
then again on August 23. The original attack was ineffective because it lacked planning 
and the second might have succeeded, but the town had prepared for the assault. Most of 
the town burned and thirty-four of its inhabitants died with sixty wounded, but they 
successfully prevented the Dakota from continuing their attack further.
47
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 The Dakota finally attacked Fort Ridgely on August 20, days after Little Crow 
advised them to do so. Originally the fort was relatively unprotected and they might have 
taken it easily, but by the time they did attack, reinforcements had arrived and the Dakota 
could not breach the fort. The Dakota fled from artillery fire and tried again on August 22 
with more men but were again forced to retreat. Little Crow led the warriors in one final 
attempt to take Fort Ridgely; however, they could not endure the cannon fire and 
ultimately gave up after six hours of intense fighting.
48
 They did not try to take the fort 
again.  
 If the Dakota had won at New Ulm and Fort Ridgely their dreams of taking 
Minnesota might have come to fruition. However, these attacks expended much of their 
man power and cost them valuable momentum. Without these victories the Dakota never 
would have been able to take Fort Snelling as they had planned. As it was, the Dakota 
gained only a fleeting victory.
49
 Ironically, the Dakota‟s long awaited annuity payments 
arrived the day after they attacked the Lower Agency. The settlers lived in constant fear 
of an Indian attack for many weeks. Refugees like those featured in the first photograph 
flocked to nearby forts and settlements in hopes that there would be safety in numbers. 
Settlers left with few belongings and many never saw their homes intact again. They 
placed their trust in their Governor Alexander Ramsey and General Henry Sibley to stop 
the uprising; however, it would take the involvement of General John Pope under the 
orders of President Abraham Lincoln to definitively end the uprising.
50
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 General John Pope declared the war with the Dakota over on October 9 1862. In a 
two-paragraph missive to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, Pope proclaimed that “The 
Sioux war may be considered at an end” and stated 1200 Indians, men, women and 
children, had already turned themselves in. A military tribunal would try the involved 
Dakota men and some suspected Winnebago warriors. Pope assured Halleck that all of 
the Dakota‟s land and crops had been destroyed.
51
 The eight-week horror many 
Minnesotan settlers experienced was finally over, but the consequences of the uprising 
had not yet been fathomed. Popular opinion in Minnesota demanded swift, harsh 
punishment for all of the Dakota. Both Minnesota‟s government and white citizens 
wanted to exterminate all the Indians, even those innocent of wrong doings, in the name 
of justice. Terror and anger reigned still, and it became clear, the relationship between 
whites and American Indians would require blood retribution and time, in order to heal.  
Missionary Stephen Riggs‟ 1869 summary of the uprising explained that the 
rebellion had “destroyed much of the civilization” which the missionaries and settlers 
struggled had to create. From the initial conflict, it took three weeks before the Union 
Army arrived and began to fight back and during that time, the Dakota ruled the 
Minnesotan plains. Originally no one, not even the settlers, believed such violence from 
the „civilized‟ Indians was even possible, but the
 
burnt buildings and the mutilated 
corpses demonstrated the potential violence from the Dakota which could not be 
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 It took far longer for the Minnesotan government to convince the east coast 
leaders of the uprising‟s gravity.  
Initially the uprising received little attention in the East. Accounts of the Dakota 
conflict first appeared in the New York Times on August 22. The article was only four 
sentences long and did not mention the gruesome horrors or the lasting terror for those 
remaining on the frontier. The newspapers reported several persons were killed at the 
Lower Agency and near Acton, but no further details were given. The paper noted that 
settlers had fled down the Minnesota River and U.S. military units had been dispatched to 
the area. The entire event was labeled a “disturbance” and gave the general public little 
cause to worry.
53
In the past, Indian uprisings had occurred often but had been quickly 
quelled by military force.  Most easterners believed it would be the same with this 
rebellion.  
Governor Ramsey and Commissioner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole wrote 
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, on August 25
 
requesting an extra month to meet 
their draft quota because the uprising had so “distracted” the state and required all 
available manpower to help in the crisis. Despite the large numbers of residents fleeting 
the violence, Stanton denied Ramsey‟s request. Two days later Ramsey pleaded his case 
to President Abraham Lincoln, claiming that: “No one not here can conceive the panic in 
the State.” Lincoln willingly granted the extension, urging Ramsey to “attend to the 
Indians.” Ever the pragmatist, Lincoln understood that “if the draft cannot proceed of 
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course it will not proceed. Necessity knows no law.”
54
 Lincoln wanted to win the Civil 
War in the East yes, but he knew he that could not risk the safety of his people to do so. 
Lincoln‟s private secretary, John G. Jay and Commissioner Dole, reported to 
Lincoln that the horrific violence in Minnesota on August 27 had caused “wild panic” in 
the state. The men called the uprising “a most terrible and exciting Indian war.” This 
description did little to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation. In mid-September, 
Major General John M. Schofield complained to Halleck that General Pope had been 
“detaining” Iowa regiments which were needed to combat the Confederates. Halleck then 
ordered Pope not to detain any regiments as: “It is not believed that you [Pope] will 




 Both General Henry Hastings Sibley and General Pope agreed that most did not 
understand the gravity of the situation. Each leader reported their lack of supplies, from 
ammunition and properly trained men, to basic needs such as bread and coats. All 
available supplies were needed for the campaigns in the South. The materials Pope and 
Sibley did receive would cause shortages in other military branches according to 
Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. Many of Pope‟s demands were denied because they 




 Frustrated Pope wrote a detailed explanation to Halleck on September 23, of the 
situation on the Minnesota frontier. He described a situation quite hopeless without more 
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military supplies. According to Pope all the settled territories in Minnesota and Nebraska 
to the Mississippi River had been abandoned. Over five hundred settlers had already been 
“murdered” and three hundred women and children taken captive. Innocent people were 
forced to witness “everything that horrible ingenuity could devise,” said Pope. In all 
likelihood the Chippewa and Winnebago Nations would soon join the rebellion unless 
Pope was given more men and supplies to stop the warring Dakota. Pope was entirely 
correct in his statement to Halleck that he had: “no idea of the wide, universal, and 
uncontrollable panic everywhere in this country.”
57
 
 So far removed from possible Indian threat, it is easily understood why those on 
the East Coast scoffed at the uprising‟s magnitude. Only those familiar with the frontier 
could grasp the potential violence and devastation an Indian attack could produce.  No 
doubt this is one of the reasons why originally Governor Ramsey put General Sibley in 
charge of putting down the uprising on August 19. Sibley not only spoke the Dakota 
language, but he had traded with them for many years. Prior to the uprising he had hunted 
with Little Crow several times. He had the respect of both the settlers and the Dakota and 
had become the first Territorial Governor of Minnesota. An educated man, from a 
prominent eastern family, Sibley left the civilized world for the frontier when he was 
eighteen where he eventually became a trader and an advocate for Indian rights. Sibley 
wanted the American Indian to be fully „civilized‟ and accepted by American society. To 
his mind, this meant giving them equal rights and treating them fairly because otherwise, 
the government was only preparing the American Indian for failure.
58
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 Any sympathy Sibley may have held for his Indian friends quickly disappeared 
upon receiving orders from Governor Ramsey to put down the rebellion. In an August 
24
th
 letter to Ramsey, Sibley admitted his “heart [was] steeled” against the Dakota and he 
would do everything in his power to destroy them. The Indians ceased being Sibley‟s 
friend when he saw the mutilated bodies of innocent families. Sibley was confident the 
Union army could beat the Indians, but he knew it would be a “bloody and desperate 
battle” as he later explained to General Pope in a September letter.
59
 Neither Sibley nor 
Pope anticipated the denial and lack of support from the government which hampered the 
efficiency of their campaign against the Dakota Nation. 
 Sibley carefully pursued the attacking Indians, but the lack of experienced men 
and cavalry made it difficult.
60
 It would not be until September when Pope forcefully 
demanded more trained troops from the War Department that Sibley did not have to rely 
solely on local militia men. Lincoln sent Pope to Minnesota immediately after his 
horrible defeat at Second Bull Run. The Union army dealt with the Indian problems in the 
frontier when they could no longer ignore it; thus, a failed general with no organized 
units was dispatched to deal with the situation. Lincoln‟s attention and all available war 
materials were needed to defeat the Confederacy as Robert E. Lee‟s Army of Northern 
Virginia marched into Maryland.
61
 Under such a direct threat to the Union heartland, 
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, a little over a week within the 
onset of the Dakota conflict. General Pope, no doubt embarrassed and upset at his reassignment, had little 
time to prepare before being thrust in the midst of an Indian war. August 30
th
 also marked the beginning of 
the Antienm Campaign in Maryland which lasted until September 18
th
. President Lincoln was fully 
engrossed with the problems of the Civil War and had little spare time for the problems in Minnesota. The 




large military resources could not be authorized for sparred skirmishes with the Indians. 
No doubt if the government had taken the attacks of Fort Ridgely more seriously and 
provided Sibley with needed troops, the incident would not have required Pope‟s battle 
expertise and may have ended long before October.  
 The final battle against the Dakota ended Tuesday morning, September 23 when 
Sibley faced Little Crow and his warriors in one last attempt to turn the war in the 
Indians‟ favor. Sibley had camped near Wood Lake, not knowing the Dakota were close 
by. Monday evening Little Crow and several Indian leaders discussed the best plan to 
attack the unsuspecting Union army. Little Crow favored a quick night surprise attack but 
once more, his people did not heed his advice and wanted to attack in daylight to better 
demonstrate their bravery and battle prowess. They did not want to be viewed as 
cowardly. The few Indians who wanted peace or to limit potential losses with the army 




 Fate rapidly intervened with Little Crow‟s battle plans. A group of Sibley‟s men 
left the main camp in search for nearby abandoned Indian fields rumored to be in the 
vicinity. They slipped away during breakfast without permission and accidently entered 
the area where a group of Dakota were waiting to later massacre the army. The Indians 
did not wish to be caught and chose to attack first. The gunfire quickly drew the attention 
of both the army and the Indians. The incident started around 7 am and was finished less 
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st
 of January. The 
Emancipation Proclamation did go into effect as Lincoln promised in the new year.  
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than two hours later. Thirty-four of Sibley‟s men were wounded, with seven dead and the 
Dakota suffered heavier losses, with fifty wounded and fifteen dead. They also lost one of 
their leaders, Mankato. The Indians were unprepared for battle when they encountered 
the Union troops and as such were grossly outnumbered by Sibley‟s men. In the drawing 
below by A.P.A Connolly titled Minnesota Massacre from 1896, it is clear the Dakota 
could never have won the battle. They lacked the necessary manpower and the supplies. 










  http://collections.mnhs.org/visualresources/image.cfm?imageid=1921&Page=1 
 
 The Dakota quickly fled up the river to their camps. Sibley declined to give chase 
as he feared the Indians would kill the white prisoners. Back in camp, the Indians tried to 
convince Little Crow to orchestrate another attack on the Union army but he refused. He 
recognized, even if his men did not, that the end had arrived. Several leaders, including 
his good friend Wabasha, claimed that perhaps the soldiers would give the Indians 
clemency if the white prisoners were returned safely but Little Crow did not believe it. 
He knew the whites would not allow the rebellion to go unpunished. Little Crow and 
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approximately one hundred of his followers left their ancestral Minnesota home for 
Canada, hoping to escape in British lands. Most of those guilty of committing atrocities 
in the uprising fled, but many stayed behind hoping the army would take pity on them.
64
 
 Three days later after the Battle of Wood Lake, on September 26, Sibley entered 
the Dakota camp as a victor. He freed over two hundred prisoners, both white and of 
mixed descent, who were overjoyed that their traumatic experience was at an end. Sibley 
also took captive two hundred and sixty Dakota Indians.
65
 The scene featured below is of 
the liberation of the prisoners. A part of an eleven scene painted panorama completed in 
1898 by New Alum artists, Anton Gag, Christian Heller, and Alexander Schewendinger, 
the release seems almost biblical in appearance. The soldiers stand proudly in the center 
of the painting, while the newly freed settlers look physically at ease; one group appears 
to be dinning in the right hand corner. The woman cradling her child at the table is 
reminiscent of Mary and baby Jesus. The couple to the left is embracing as the women 






                                                          
64
 Oehler, The Great Sioux Uprising, 196-197; Jones, The Minnesota,  217-218; Schultz, Over the Earth I 
Come, 235-237; Gluek, “The Sioux Uprising: A Problem in International Relations,” 317-318. 
The British did not welcome the Dakota as they feared an Indian attack of their own. Troops constantly 
supervised their settlements and eventually the Dakota returned to the Minnesota frontier. Little Crow was 
shot in the back by settlers a year later while picking berries. The Dakota caused tense relations between 
Britain and the United States.  
 
65





















Kenneth, Carley, The Dakota War of 1862: Minnesota’s Other Civil War (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society Press, 1976), 67.  
 
Sibley aptly named the encampment, Camp Release. In the following days the 
Dakota released another three hundred and fifty captives. Within a week, over 800 
Dakota, men, women and children surrendered. Sibley promised to treat those who 
willingly surrendered as prisoners of war, otherwise the Indians would be treated as 
hostiles and killed. Faced with the uncertain future of starvation while wintering on the 
Great Plains, many chose to take their chances with the United States government. The 
Dakota who did not surrender, and chose not to flee with Little Crow, went west and 
joined other Native American tribes who would later resist further white settlements.
66
 
Sibley repeatedly stated he only wished to punish the guilty Indians. In letters to 
four Indian Chiefs, Ma-Za-Ka-Tame, Toopee, Wa Ke-Nen-Nan-Te, and Ta-Tanka-Nazin, 
Sibley promised fair treatment for the Indians innocent of any wrong doings. If they 
surrendered peacefully and produced the white captives, the wounded Indians would be 
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medically treated, and the dead buried with respect. Sibley continued to stress that he 
would make every attempt to separate the innocent from the guilty and not to condemn 
all. It seems that the Dakota could count upon their long time ally Wapetonhonska, the 
Long Trader, to be fair in his deliverance of justice. He did not tolerate unnecessary 
violence or cruelty; he condemned any scalping of dead Indians by soldiers and 
disciplined those who ignored his ruling.
67
 Like Lincoln, Sibley wanted retribution but 
not at the cost of innocent lives or the use of brutality. 
 Once the rebellion had been stopped, all attention became fixated on what 
punishment needed to be meted out to the errant Indians. Since September, Pope had 
been very clear what needed to be done to the Dakota. The entire incident “[called] for 
punishment beyond human power to inflict” Pope confided to Sibley in a letter. He 
planned to fully exterminate all Indians who did not turn themselves in, and would not 
allow for any truce or treaties. Pope told Sibley that the Indians should “be treated as 
maniacs or wild beasts” and that a scorched earth policy should be enacted toward the 
Dakota. Pope wanted the Indians herded to the plains and destroyed. Sibley agreed with 
Pope, and created a military tribunal to try the captured Indians. He questioned his legal 
power to do so, but wanted to make an example to prevent any further outbreaks.
68
 
 Sibley tricked the surrendered Dakota into cooperating with the military trials. 
Indian Agent Galbraith asked all the Indian families to report to the warehouse to sign in 
and receive the long awaited annuities. He even promised a bonus. Pleasantly surprised, 
the Dakota eagerly obeyed. They never suspected a thing, not even when asked to give up 
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their weapons. The men were separated from their families at the warehouse, and after 
entering the building, were shackled and led away. There were not enough shackles for 
all the Indian prisoners, and they were chained by the ankles, two by two. As Sibley 
stated in a letter to Pope, all Indians would be treated as guilty until the military trials 
found them innocent.
69
 This is a direction contradiction to what Sibley had told various 
Indian leaders earlier about promised clemency for the innocent, but his statements 
regarding the treatment of the Indians to Pope do correlate with his promises to make all 
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 The Indians in the photograph above, taken by a soldier known as “Whitney” in 
1862, were Dakota prisoners awaiting their trial. The soldiers stand proudly behind them, 
confident that the Indians will not flee and posed no further threat. While the Indians who 
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so recently stood up to them, sat submissively on the ground, huddled in blankets for 
warmth, their eyes appear downcast in front of the camera with no sign of hope. 
Conditions were poor inside Camp Release for the Dakota. Over two thousand Indians 
were being housed and approximately 1600 soldiers. Supplies were severely limited. All 
unnecessary cattle were killed for food and to conserve the forage grains. Indian women 
foraged for corn and potatoes in the nearby abandoned fields. Those were the only rations 
the Indians received besides bread twice a week, if it was available. Considering the 
hatred for all Indians in the aftermath of the summer, it is unlikely any extra supplies 
went to the Dakota. Bread was a scarcity in Camp Release because although the Union 
army could supply some flour, cooking it was very difficult.
70
 The Indians who thought 
the government would grant leniency were sadly mistaken.  If anything the conditions for 
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 The above image of Camp Release by Isaac Heard, member of General Sibley‟s 
staff and recorder at the trials, did not illuminate the flawed “justice” going on within by 
the military tribunal which decided the fate of many Dakota men.  The drawing depicted 
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only the soldiers‟ tents and did not hint at the poor conditions suffered by the Dakota 
Sibley created the tribunal, assigning five men from local militias and adding more as 
needed once it became clear individual Indians could be held responsible for specific acts 
committed against settlers. Colonel William Crooks, Lieutenant Colonel William R. 
Marshall, Captain Hiram Grant, Captain Hiram Bailey, and Lieutenant Rollin Olin were 
all hand picked by Sibley to oversee the trials and decide the verdicts. The Minnesota 
Board of Commissioners (MBC) later applauded the tribunal for their work and 
steadfastly claimed that they treated all the Indians humanely and with respect.
71
 
 Isaac Heard professed to the MBC the unevenhandedness in the trials and swore it 
had not been “organized to convict.” The trials were fair according to him and many 
others. Between September 30 and November 5, 1862, four hundred and twenty-five 
Dakota men were tried. Three hundred and twenty-one men were found guilty of the 
charges brought against them, and three hundred and three were sentenced to death by 
hanging. Those deemed less guilty would receive jail sentences up to ten years. 
Missionary Riggs estimated that thirty to forty cases were completed in a day. He 
disagreed with Heard‟s statements of fairness because Riggs believed the trials were too 
hurried for any facts to be heard. Riggs surmised the justification for the speedy trials was 
that the defendants were Indians and the tribunal felt they did not deserve the same legal 
treatment as white citizens.
72
 As demonstrated by their verdict, the tribunal believed that 
any participation in the uprising equaled punishment by death. 
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 The image above is of a woodcut from 1862 depicting a young white boy 
accusing several Dakota men during the trials. The boy is very well dressed compared to 
the defendants, his arm in a sling representing the bodily harm done to many of the 
settlers. The noticeable gap in the middle of the room between the Dakota and the white 
people tell of the strong divide between the two groups. Soldiers stand behind him 
protectively while the Indians look on with disdain and possible confusion
 
. It is entirely 
possible the Indians did not fully comprehend the trials or what was happening to them. 
There is no way to know if the Dakota understood their lives were at stake or if they even 
understood the Western conceptions of justice.
73
 
 Legal scholar, Carol L. Chomsky examined in detail the many legal problems 
with the Dakota War trials she found in her study of the proceedings. The western 
concept of warfare differed greatly from traditional American Indian groups. Indians 
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routinely attacked the women and children of their enemies and took captives, while 
Europeans fought only the enemy‟s army in open warfare, avoiding harming innocents 
when possible. The military tribunal did not consider these cultural differences. They also 
did not take into account that part of the Dakota culture consisted of bragging about their 
battle exploits, it was expected. It is likely the Indians assumed that is why the trials 
questioned their activities in the uprising and exaggerated their own involvement to 
increase their standing within the tribe. The Dakota considered touching their enemy to 




 Regardless of any cultural misunderstandings between the Union army and the 
Dakota, the tribunal still ignored the Indians‟ legal rights. They were given no legal 
representation or counseling by a lawyer. Since the Army created a military tribunal to 
decide the Dakota‟s fate, the government silently declared that the Indians were not 
American civilians but a sovereign nation fighting a war against the United States. As 
such the Dakota should have been tried as soldiers under the Laws of War, and not held 
accountable by civilian laws of murder, rape, or robbery as the Dakota were. In addition, 
the tribunal failed to recognize that since the Dakota decided as a group, to war against 
the settlers, individuals who broke away from their tribe to commit crimes without the 
group‟s sanction, should have been treated as “belligerents” and the Dakota nation could 
not be held responsible or forced to pay reparations for those individual acts.
75
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 Missionary Stephen Riggs interviewed the settlers, taking their statements 
regarding their experiences during the Indian uprising and during their captivity. Riggs 
was charged with talking to the women who suffered personal violations. With the 
exception of the Indians who were identified by their accusers, most of the Dakota faced 
general charges of robbery, murder, and other outrages. Crimes against women worsened 
the animosity towards the Indians and many of the accusations were false.
76
 Each 
defendant was allowed to speak to his innocence before the tribunal called witnesses. A 
majority of the witnesses were those of mixed heritage who claimed the Dakota forced 
them to participate in the uprising and white women who claimed personal injury at the 
hands of the raiding Indians. Irrefutable evidence was not needed to convict the men, they 
could be found guilty simply for being seen at a place of attack. Their own testimonies of 
participating in battle, or simply firing a weapon even if the shot hit nothing, were 
enough to convince the tribunal that all the Indians were guilty. Missionary Riggs 
concluded that the Dakota were “condemned on general principals.”
77
 Approximately 
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 All the Indians were guilty, even those who did not participate in the uprising 
because they would have if they could. As summarized by Riggs, “To them [the military 
tribunal] an Indian is an Indian”. Despite claims of judicial fairness, it is obvious that 
those harmed by the Dakota, and the avenging soldiers, could not separate the guilty from 
the innocent in the trials. The MBC report stated that no one on the tribunal intended to 
sentence so many to death. However the witness‟ testimonies caused such a violent 
reaction in the public and with the tribunal that many wanted to kill all the Indians, 
regardless of their involvement. It was only because the military feared negative publicity 
from other countries that they limited themselves to sentencing three hundred and three 
men to death. The MBC feared the Confederacy would accuse the Union of unjustly 
murdering prisoners of war. The MBC‟s report stated “We [Minnesota] were engaged in 
a great civil war, and the eyes of the world [the rest of the country and Europe] were 
upon us.” The tribunal did not want to be accused of being: “incapable of making the 
proper discriminations” when it came to delivering justice.
79
 
 There was a large outcry against the decision by many missionaries and from 
those in the East. Sentencing over three hundred men to die in a seemingly hasty military 
trial tugged at the heart strings and conscience of many humanitarians. The MBC 
disagreed with those who found fault with the trial results. In their report they called the 
protestors “well-intentioned but ill-informed people” who “besieged President Lincoln to 
put a stop to the proposed executions.”
80
 Missionary Riggs, one of many who wrote to 
Lincoln on the Dakota‟s behalf, wanted only to find a middle ground in punishing the 
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Indians. The Dakota understood that many white people had died because of the uprising 
and because of that they would be punished, but the question remained how many Indians 
















The Indians in the drawing above from artist W.H. Childs ca. 1863 await 
Lincoln‟s verdict in a wooden prison. The dark coloring of the drawing mimics the 
hopelessness for  the Indians. They sit huddled together, heads down dejectedly, in the 
almost lightless prison, attended by only a few guards. The artist‟s rendition depicts 
countless Indians but the army clearly does not perceive them to be a threat with only two 
guards watching them. The days of the proud Dakota obviously had come to an end, they 
were now powerless and completely reliant upon the Union army and the United States 
government for survival. 
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 Both Sibley and Pope, along with most of Minnesotan citizens, wanted to carry 
out the executions as soon as possible. It was unclear if they possessed the legal authority 
to do so. Sibley had been concerned over the legality of the trials, and the executions, 
since early October. In a letter to Pope dated October 15, Sibley requested that it be 
confirmed he “[had] the legal authority to order a general court martial.”
82
 He would not 
move forward with the hanging without presidential sanction. The War Department never 
responded to their request seeking permission. Pope grew restless and on November 7 
1862, he telegraphed President Lincoln asking for authorization. He included all the 
names of the condemned in his request, and the telegraph cost over four-hundred dollars 
to send. A sum many considered to be exorbitant during the war.
83
  
 Lincoln responded to Pope‟s request three days later on November 10 to delay the 
executions until he examined the trial records himself. He asked Pope to send him, by 
mail, the names of all the condemned men, their trial records, and any statements they 
may have made in regards to their innocence or guilt. Lincoln wanted to be sure that “the 
more guilty and influential” Dakota were distinguishable from their counterparts. 
Governor Ramsey telegraphed Lincoln on November 10
th
 as well, urging the president to 
execute the condemned men without delay or further investigation. Ramsey feared that if 
the Dakota were not hanged, Minnesotans would participate in vigilante revenge and kill 
the Indians themselves. Lincoln declined to answer Ramsey‟s plea and forwarded the 
wire to the Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. Pope sent a similar telegraph to the 
President on November 11
 
also voicing fear of “indiscriminate murder” of all the Indians 
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if the convicted men were not executed immediately. He claimed all the Indians were 
guilty of killing and raping, but to varying degrees. An incident such as the rebellion 
deserved a mass hanging because it was so offensive. The Indians involved were not 
“wild Indians” but those in the process of being „civilized‟ which made it even more 
heinous according to Pope. Lincoln would not be swayed. He announced on November 
18, that he would decide for himself the outcome but only after he made his annual 
address to Congress on December 1.
84
  
 The president sought legal counsel from Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt in 
early December. Could he designate his forthcoming decision regarding the hangings to 
someone else, or was it necessary that he personally examine the cases? Holt responded 
that Lincoln must do it personally, he could not delegate as only the resident could grant 
pardons. It might be possible to challenge the procedure but no president had thus far. 
Holt went on to suggest that if Lincoln desired more legal advice that he contact the 
Attorney General Edward Bates. There is no evidence if Lincoln solicited help regarding 
his decision. In fact, there are no documents suggesting his personal feelings or thoughts 
about the trials. 
85
 
 The trial records Pope mailed to Lincoln were grossly incomplete but in less than 
a month the president announced his decision. On December 6, Lincoln forwarded to 
General Sibley a list of thirty-nine Dakota men, carefully spelled with the correct 
corresponding case number, to be executed on December 19. He specified that the 
prisoners must be protected until that time from “any unlawful violence.” When Lincoln 
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addressed the Senate on December 11
th
 at their request about his decision, he claimed that 
he acted with enough clemency to provide justice but not unfairly or maliciously. Lincoln 
based his decisions upon the sorts of acts committed, and distinguished between 
massacres and battles. The Indians who violated women or participated in massacres 
against innocents, would be held accountable for their crimes.
86
 
 Historian Chomsky concluded in her study that Lincoln did the best he could 
considering the lack of evidence and improperly conducted trials. The Dakota were only 
guilty of fighting a war, even if Lincoln did not recognize the Indian nation‟s sovereign 
status. The Dakota Nation declared war upon the United States and the men should have 
been treated as prisoners of war, not as criminals. Chomsky concluded that Lincoln made 
the most humane decision he could to avoid the mass hanging which Pope, Sibley and so 
many others vehemently advocated. Instead of killing over three hundred men, or 
decimating an entire American Indian Nation, Lincoln selected thirty-nine men who 




 General Sibley had considered moving the imprisoned Indians to Fort Snelling for 
their safety since October. While waiting to hear Lincoln‟s decision, Sibley moved the 
prisoners and the Dakota families to the fort where it would be easier to care for the 
Indians. He did not anticipate the violent reaction from the citizens of New Ulm on 
November 11 when the Indians passed through the town. With mob like rage, men, 
women and children rushed the Indians with whatever weapons they had, including 
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stones and clubs. Before the soldiers could react, many of the Indians, the women, 
children, and the elderly were pulled away from the procession and beaten. One witness 
claimed that a white woman grabbed a nursing baby from its Indian mother and hurled it 
to the ground. Missionary Riggs summarized that: “the people came out and made an 
insane attack upon the prisoners.”
88
 The drawing below from an unknown artist in 
November 1862, demonstrates the rage the citizens held towards the Indians, particularly 
the women who seemingly lead the attack according to the artist‟s rendition. The Indians 













 The Dakota reached Fort Snelling on November 11. The photograph below is of 
the fenced in teepees at the fort. Positioned near the Minnesota River the gloomy image 
depicts the Indian situation well. The Dakota were placed on the miry land tract that 
offered no protection from the weather or river. They received few rations from the 
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government and disease ran rampant in the camp. Many did not survive the winter.
89
 
Even the Indians who had done nothing wrong, other than being of Dakota heritage, were 










Once Lincoln announced his decision, the condemned prisoners were moved to 
the town of Mankato for the hanging. They were heavily guarded, manacled, and 
protected from the populace than the last Indian procession. At Mankato, Missionary 
Riggs was allowed the closest contact with the Dakota, frequently acting as an 
intermediary to their families. He and other missionaries reported several conversions and 
baptisms while the Indians waited for their death on December 19. All but two were 
baptized before the execution. The hanging date was postponed on December 16 when 
Lincoln wired to General Sibley that the original date did not allow for enough 
preparation time and the execution would take place December 26
th
. Lincoln urged Sibley 
to act with “great discretion” as he feared public reaction would intervene with the 
                                                          
89







 He did not want any more mob violence towards the Dakota, as 
much as possible Lincoln wanted the Indians treated humanely.  
On December 22, those sentenced to hang were separated from the Indians who 
would serve their sentences in jail. They spent the last few days of their lives visiting 
missionaries like Riggs and seeing their families when the army allowed. The Dakota 
recognized, according to Riggs, that some needed to be punished for the tribe‟s actions, 
even if they were innocent, blood for blood retribution was required. Many still 
proclaimed their innocence. As the execution day approached the Dakota chanted their 
death songs according to the surviving accounts. On December 26, after breakfast, the 
guards lined the men up according to names and corresponding identification numbers. 
There is some evidence of possible name confusion or numbers not matching correctly, 
but the Army has always denied any wrongdoing. The Dakota men walked to the scaffold 
resolutely, without tears or pleading. Within minutes the large crowd that had gathered to 
witness the hanging, dispersed after watching the largest mass execution in America‟s 
history take place. Lincoln received a one sentence telegram from Sibley stating that he 
had the “honor to inform” the president of the hanging which occurred “quietly” around 
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The above drawing from W.H. Childs, dated from the day of the execution, shows 
the scaffolding with the Dakota awaiting their fate, and the massive group of people 
congregated to witness the hanging. The execution alone did not pacify the angry 
Minnesotans. Government officials suggested various plans ranging from exiling them to 
some isolated land tract within the United States to whipping them to death while letting 
the rest starve so only a few would survive. Indian Agent Galbraith suggested the latter, 
more malicious punishment. On February 16, 1863 Congress annulled all treaties with the 
Dakota, voided any rights, and redirected the annuity money as reparations to the settlers. 
A month later on March 3 with the Indian Removal Act or the Sioux Act as it is also 
known, Congress announced that all of Dakota‟s land in Minnesota, over a million acres, 
would be publicly sold. The Dakota would be removed to Crow Creek Missouri, a 
desolate land tract compared to the rich agricultural land they had been forced to leave 




treated the Dakota as criminals in the trials that they were able to confiscate their tribal 
lands for public sale.
92
 
Prior to Lincoln‟s decision and even before the military tribunal finished the 
hearings, General Pope had made plans to hunt down the renegade Dakota who fled after 
the Battle of Wood Lake. Those who sought refuge in Canada were chased back into 
United States‟ territory, while the Union army started a full-ledge Indian campaign 
against the Dakota and all western American Indian nations that would span decades.
93
 
Not everyone agreed with the punishment for the Dakota. Some like Galbraith, Pope, and 
Ramsey thought Lincoln had gone too easily on the Indians, and that more needed to be 
executed. Citizens in the western states agreed, Indian attacks needed to be met with 
violent force to prevent future outbreaks. Others, primarily those from the east coast and 
missionaries, placed the blame entirely on the government who neglected to fix the 
flawed reservation system. The government needed to take responsibility for their role in 
the Dakota War. Although no one mentioned it, what everyone needed, even the Dakota 
Nation, was healing, something only time and the shaping of memory could allow.
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The media‟s reaction to the Dakota War was immediate. Newspapers commented 
extensively on Lincoln‟s decision while artists supplied their own version of the events; 
the uprising became the focal point in several panoramas, and in many paintings and 
drawings as well. These artistic interpretations naturally differed as did the various 
editorial commentaries, but the one constant variable was that all these sources came 
from the white perspective. The white public took control over how the event was being 
remembered while the Dakota faded quietly into the background as they were removed 
from their tribal homelands and struggled to survive in a hostile environment. By default 
superiority, the white population controlled how the Dakota War would be remembered 
and they chose to focus upon their own innocence in the face of the Indians‟ unprovoked, 
„savage‟ actions. This can be seen in the newspapers, artwork from the time period, and 
the monuments which the citizens of Minnesota erected to memorialize various events 
from the uprising.  
 Newspapers throughout America, both in the Confederacy and within the Union, 
including the western territories, followed the uprising from late August until January 
after the thirty-nine men Dakota men had met their death at the gallows. Opinions varied 
from region to region, and the demographic base of the newspaper‟s audience effected 
how the paper interpreted the event, but most newspapers discussed the Dakota War and 
the ultimate hanging, if only briefly. Some continued to insist the uprising was a part of a 
much larger move by the Confederacy to distract the Union army from its eastern 
campaigns, but many used the opportunity to expound upon the problems with the 




Newspapers did describe the horrors of the initial uprising and many offered commentary 
on what should be done with the imprisoned Dakota, but none openly condoned 
Lincoln‟s final verdict on the matter.  
 From early September, the New York Times called for forced removal of the 
Dakota from Minnesota. This step appeared necessary on the frontier since they could not 
be controlled and thus could not protect the settlers. The Spirit Lake Massacre of 1857 
was cited by the newspaper as a previous example of the Dakota barbarity and 
unpredictability. Either the Dakota needed to be removed farther west, away from 
civilization, or they needed to be exterminated. Little was directly said about what fate 
should await the accused warriors but it was clear the writers of the New York Times 
favored strict punishment. The skeptical tone in the articles demonstrated the belief that 
all the Indians were guilty and deserving death of the military tribunal had decreed. In a 
December 8
th
 article titled, “Diplomatic Correspondence,” the author stated: “Everyone 
of these monsters deserves death.” Not doing so would dishonor the settlers who suffered 
in the uprising claimed the New York Times.
94
 
 The same article also stated that the country should not try influencing the 
president‟s decision. Abraham Lincoln would do what he perceived to be best, and the 
decision should be left “to his own careful and conscientious judgment.” Increasingly that 
became the stance of the New York Times, that it was best to leave the matter to Lincoln‟s 
discretion and obey his wishes. The mass extermination favored by many no longer 
seemed to be the most just. On December 3
 
the newspaper printed excerpts of 
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Commissioner William Dole‟s “Report of Indian Affairs” along with their opinions on 
his conclusions. Some punishment was needed; however, killing over three hundred men 
would be more revenge than retribution said the paper: “These are savages, far beneath us 
in either moral or intellectual culture” and the Indians cannot be judged using “our 
standards of morals.” The newspaper agreed with Commissioner Dole that only the 
uprising leaders should face punishment by death, while the participants should receive a 
lesser degree of punishment.
95
 
 The actual execution received only four sentences in the New York Times. The 
newspaper did not favor clemency in the beginning but by the time of the hanging, they 
agreed with Lincoln‟s decision. Other newspapers New England voiced arguments 
similar to the New York Times. The New Hampshire Patriot and Gazette specifically 
stated that the “few agents and contractors” who “provoked the Indians” should be 
executed alongside the thirty-nine men Lincoln found guilty. The newspaper praised 
Lincoln‟s decision and his refusal to give into peer pressure to exterminate all of the 
Dakota. The hanging was referred to as a “whole sale slaughter” by the Patriot and 
Gazette, but no other opinion was given on the matter.
96
 
 Farther north in Maine and Vermont, newspapers also echoed support for 
Lincoln‟s decision. The Portland Daily Advertiser urged the Minnesotans who threatened 
to kill the imprisoned Dakota themselves, to respect and obey the president; civil 
authorities would have the final say regardless of what the public may want. As 
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suggested by an article titled, “Peace with the Minnesota Indians,” the newspaper wanted 
peace with the Dakota, not more violence. The Vermont Phoenix hoped only that 
President Lincoln would be “equally just” when he punished Jefferson Davis, President 
of the Confederacy.
97
 The newspaper‟s editor obviously supported Lincoln‟s decision if 
he thought the punishment would be suitable for the Confederate leader.  
 Newspapers from the East Coast were more willing than their western 
counterparts to admit or see the problems with the reservation system and the role the 
government played in the initial uprising. In late August The Sun of Baltimore and the 
Philadelphia Enquirer both cited the government for being at fault for the rebellion; 
however the Philadelphia newspaper did not share the same amount of sympathy for the 
Indians as The Sun. The Enquirer did not perceive the Indians to be anything other than 
„savages‟ in need of harsh punishment. While the Baltimore paper considered the Dakota 
to be “outlaws,” and hoped for extermination or total removal from Minnesota‟s borders 
like the Enquirer did, the editor still retained a surprising amount of empathetic 
objectivity towards the American Indian.
98
 
 In an article printed in early October, long before President Lincoln became 
involved, The Sun, explained to its audience the causes of the Indian attacks and named 
the United States government as the culprit. Since the beginning, the Indians had been 
“swindled” by the government and its “unprincipled” agents, said the paper, even as the 
settlers encroached upon the designated Indian lands. The revolt occurred because the 
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Dakota did not receive their promised payments and their frustrations with the 
government overflowed: “It‟s believed that the country was now reaping the result of 
their wrongs to the Indians.” The Sun realized that the deeds committed by the Dakota 
were too “great” to be ignored, and recognized “little mercy” would be given. 
Unsurprised, the editor accorded the hanging only one sentence in the newspaper, simply 
stating: “they were hung yesterday.” The newspaper did not mention the uprising or the 
hanging again nor did they comment on Lincoln‟s clemency decisions. Clearly they 




 The New York Daily Tribune shared the same sentiment as The Sun. The Tribune 
more specifically stated the problems with the Indian system and clearly spoke on behalf 
of the Dakota. Surprisingly unbiased for the time period, the paper outlined the history of 
unfair treaties made with the Indians, and expounded upon the dishonorable acts of 
corrupt Indian agents. The article simply titled “The Indian War in Minnesota,” described 
the abuses experienced by Indian women at the hands of white men, the evils of whisky 
when given to Indians, and the traders who took advantage of them. The Tribune called 
for a massive change with the current system: “They have been grievously wronged and 
outraged, and have a thousand grievances or causes of compliant against us.” The 
newspaper was unclear about the hanging but it agreed that Lincoln did the only thing he 
could do legally and morally by executing just those proven guilty of specific crimes.
100
 
                                                          
99
 “Cause of the Indian Attack in Minnesota,” The Sun, 2 October 1862, 2; “Horrors of Indian Warfare,” 
The Sun, 6 November 1862, 1; “Executions of Indians,” The Sun, 27 December 1862, 4.  
 
100
 “The Indian War in Minnesota,” The New York Daily Tribune, 5 September 1862, 2; “From 





 Missionaries only saw the problems with the system and the government‟s role, 
but they believed the Indians should be awarded clemency for their actions since the 
uprising was not entirely their fault. The authors of the Philadelphia Enquirer considered 
such beliefs to be “misplaced philanthropy.” There was a movement in the City of 
Brotherly Love from the Society of Friends, the Quakers, to petition Lincoln for a 
presidential pardon on behalf of the condemned Dakota. The Enquirer admitted the 
Quakers meant well; however, the atrocities committed on so many innocents prevented 
any possible mercy. The Indians, according to the newspaper, “have not been sufficiently 
chastised for their late wanton massacres.”
101
 
 The New York Times published a letter from a man identified only as Father 
Beeson on November 29, who echoed the same sentiment that no capital punishment 
should be given to the Dakota men. Father Beeson pointed out that since American 
Indians were not seen as citizens they should not be treated as such, meaning they should 
not be held accountable to American laws. He even went as far as to suggest that perhaps 
white men dressed as Indians led the attacks and the Dakota had nothing to do with the 
uprising.
102
 Beeson most likely proposed that idea to demonstrate the Indians‟ innocence 
and their need for mercy. He demanded more protection for the American Indians, along 
with proper land ordinances, and clearly defined legal rights. Although the New York 
Times did not comment on Father Beeson‟s letter, they did respond to the writings of 
Bishop Henry Benjamin Whipple, who strongly advocated prison sentences for the 
Dakota. They did agree with Bishop Whipple that the nation might be at fault, and the 
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system needed to be changed because it was clearly not working, but blood retribution 
was still needed to compensate for the suffering of so many innocents.
103
 
 Bishop Whipple in a report to President Lincoln pointedly said that God would 
hold the nation accountable for the uprising‟s atrocities. Some of the Dakota‟s strongest 
supporters came from Minnesota, even the missionaries who witnessed firsthand the 
horrors of the Dakota War, pleaded for mercy in their sentencing. Missionary Stephen 
Riggs openly condemned the government, saying that America had failed in their 
Christian duty. His daughter, Martha said in a letter written to the Cincinnati Christian 
Herald, that executing the Dakota would curse America for generations. The country had 
corrupted the Indians with alcohol and immoral traders, treated them with disrespect, and 
denied them a livelihood.
104
 Hanging the Dakota for a crime perpetrated by the 
government, defied logic and Christian morality for many missionaries. 
 The majority of the country disagreed with the missionary‟s viewpoint. The New 
York Times printed an article from St. Paul Minnesota, in response to the pleadings of 
missionaries and said the Indians could not appreciate any mercy given to them because 
they lacked the humanity to understand it. Forgiveness would be wasted, and it would fail 
to prevent future Indian outbreaks.
105
 Only capital punishment would suffice in protecting 
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the frontiers and offer justice to the bereaved families. As stated by Harper’s Weekly in 
mid-January, the hanging was needed: “to answer for their inhuman barbarities.”
106
 
 The western territories frequently could not perceive any humanity in the Dakota 
Nation or with American Indians in general. The uprising only proved that Indians could 
not be trusted and needed to be “crushed” as stated by the Weekly Dakotian from 
Yankton, South Dakota. The Dakota: “have amply deserved the retribution which is in 
store for them” the newspaper reported, and it was up to the citizens to punish the Indians 
as the settlers are “God‟s fierce avengers in the future.” An unknown reporter who 
interviewed the convicted Dakota men during their last few days before the execution 
could not accept the human attributes he witnessed in the prisoners. The fact that they 
civilly conversed with him and offered to shake his hand, offended the man for all he 
could see was the blood of so many innocents. He reported himself “disgusted with such 
an illustration of fallen humanity.”
107
 The man‟s image of an American Indian was one of 
savagery, and untamed wildness resulting in horrendous barbarity. That the men he saw 
in chains physically resembled his own self, and acted in a „civil‟ manner, perplexed him 
to the point of extreme discomfort. He could not see pass the atrocities committed and 
instead, he encouraged the extermination of all the Indians, preferring to perceive the 
Dakota as nothing more than „savages.‟  
 Other newspapers in the western portion of the United States shared the same 
opinion. As early as August 23, the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer was promising a 
“vengeance as they have never yet received” and eagerly awaited “a day of reckoning” 
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for the Dakota. While the Wisconsin Patriot acknowledged the Dakota had not received 
their annuity payments, the newspaper still promised extermination and “annihilation,” 
even if the Indians surrendered. The Wisconsin Daily Patriot also promised ammunition 
to Minnesota to assist in “exterminating the savage Indians.”
108
  
One of the more spiteful comments about the Dakota came from the Wisconsin 
Chief, published in Fort Atkinson. They were not subtle about wanting to decimate all of 
the Indians, even those not directly involved in the uprising. The article appeared on 
September 3, but even then the paper was eagerly awaiting the demise of the Dakota: 
“The red savages will be exterminated. Happy for them now if they only owned niggers.” 
The Wisconsin Chief stated the same thoughts as its rival newspapers from Wisconsin, 
only with more clearly apparent hatred for the Indians. 
109
 
  The Dakota Republican printed in Vermillion, South Dakota used similar tones 
as the newspapers in Wisconsin. Their newspaper publications were sparse and erratic 
but the tones used in reporting the initial uprisings, and discussing Lincoln‟s verdict, 
supported the execution along with the promised vigilantism proposed by the Minnesota 
settlers. They believed Lincoln and his “promise”
110
 to deal with the rest of the renegade 
Dakota. Surprisingly the newspaper understood the president‟s logic because the only 
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reservation system, and he promised to punish more Dakota if the need arose. He assured the nation, and 
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witnesses in the military tribunal were surviving captives whose testimonies might have 
been flawed by their personal experiences. The Dakota Republican was also the only 
newspaper from any region to suggest removing the remaining Dakota to the East where 
they could be surrounded by “friends and sympathizers,” further suggesting that those on 




  The Liberty Tribune published in Liberty, Missouri, had relatively little to say 
about the matter despite the fact that many Unionists were convinced the Confederate 
sympathizers in the state instigated the uprising, even though no evidence indicated this. 
Their proximity to Minnesota no doubt allowed the Tribune to be more sympathetic to 
the settlers‟ plight; the threat of an Indian uprising was very real to Missourians as well. 
For those of Liberty, the Dakota War merely added “another and bloodier feature to the 
drama of this war.”
112
  
The Confederacy stood equally diverse as the Union in their opinions. Not all 
southern newspapers covered the uprising or the subsequent execution, and many 
editorials did not physically survive the war, but a few of the surviving newspapers did 
offer their views. Published in Columbus, Georgia, the Daily Columbus Enquirer, a 
Confederate newspaper sympathetic to the Indians, expressed hope that the Union army 
could put down the rebellion before more died. Compared to some of the other southern 
newspapers which held no empathy for the northern settlers, the amount of caring on 
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behalf of this Georgia newspaper is surprising. The Daily Columbus Enquirer called for 
intense fighting to end the uprising, but like some Unionist newspapers, cited the 
government for being at fault in instigating the Indian‟s ire. Despite this, the paper 
warned that unless the Dakota were exterminated, the Indians would continue on their 
rampage and no town would be safe: “Here is a new and startling danger – let it be 
promptly met.”
113
 The Daily Columbus Enquirer may have offered an opinion on 
Lincoln‟s verdict and the hanging but the corresponding issues are not available. It can 
only be assumed that the paper would have supported the execution. No doubt the terror 
they felt in their own homes at the threat of invasions by the Union army fueled their 
understanding of the Minnesotans‟ fear.  
In Richmond, Virginia the authors of the Richmond Enquirer were not 
sympathetic or compassionate to the terror suffered by those on the Minnesota plains. 
They mentioned the uprising only briefly in their coverage of Lincoln‟s annual message 
in early December. Offended that the Union still believed the Confederacy to be at fault 
for the rebellion, the authors said it was the “bad faith of the United States” which caused 
the death of so many innocent settlers. The Union did not keep their promises to the 
American Indians just as they had previously failed to protect the South‟s right to slavery. 
The North was getting exactly what it deserved for not keeping its promises, and received 
the same treatment they would have wished “inflict[ed] upon the South.”
114
 The dividing 
lines between the North and South were clearly drawn in Virginia with no care for the 
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fate of their enemies who were once their fellow statesmen. Without a doubt the 
Confederates who shared the same opinion as put forth in the Richmond Enquirer 
believed the Dakota War to be a righteous act.  Not only had the Union mistreated the 
Indians, but they were at war with the Confederacy.  
The Daily Picayune published in New Orleans, Louisiana, not only supported 
Lincoln‟s decision, they feared the president changing his mind and granting more 
pardons to the convicted Dakota men. The paper understood that Lincoln wanted 
evidence before he sentenced anyone to death; he would not convict innocent men simply 
to pacify the American people. Although the Daily Picayune remained fearful of the 
uprising spreading, their overall tone supported Lincoln‟s verdict.
115
 Many throughout the 
U.S. shared the newspaper‟s fear of further uprisings from other Indian Nations. 
Even after the Dakota had surrendered and the military trials against them had 
begun, the Minnesotan settlers remained afraid, aware of their tenuous position on the 
frontier. It required a statement from General John Pope urging the settlers to return 
home, to convince many that it was safe to return to their homesteads.
116
 As demonstrated 
by the newspaper articles from across the United States, all had their own opinions on 
who was truly at fault for the rebellion, and what fate should await the guilty Indians. 
Lincoln received petitions on behalf of the Indians along with demands from Minnesotan 
politicians to execute all of the Dakota Nation. Ultimately, he made the only decision he 
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could which satisfied his philanthropic morals while fulfilling the country‟s need for 
revenge.  
Those in Minnesota, specifically those who suffered at the hands of the warring 
Dakota, could not let go of their anger. Lincoln‟s refusal to mass exterminate all the 
Indians created a lasting resentment towards the president and the nation. The angry 
citizens consoled themselves by attending the hanging in December and by claiming the 
lands opened up for purchase when the government forcibly removed the Indians. 
Monetary reparation requests were also filed with the United States government, many of 
which took years to process and fulfill. Lincoln‟s decision did cost him votes in 
Minnesota in the 1864 election. He still won the electoral votes, however the margin was 
much slimmer than in 1860. In the previous presidential election he carried Minnesota by 
ten thousand votes, but in the 1864 reelection year, he led George McClellan with only 
seven thousand votes. When Governor Ramsey, then a senator, visited Lincoln at the 
White House following the 1864 election, he noted to Lincoln that he might have won 
more votes if he had executed the Dakota. Ramsey made the comment in jest according 
to historian David Nichols; however, Lincoln refused to joke about the lives of anyone, 




Harper’s Weekly was entirely correct in their statement that recovery would take a 
long time for those on the Minnesota frontier. The magazine predicted peace would not 
be had “until they have hunted every Indian into the mountains.”
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 The United States 
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government did indeed spend several decades “hunting” American Indians on the western 
plains, forcing them with treaties and the threat of extinction to move on reservations, and 
demanding Indian youth to be schooled in government regulated boarding schools. It 
would take much more than military and government action against the American Indian 
to aid in the healing process of the Dakota War.  
Numerous writings concerning the uprising appeared soon after. Survivors wrote 
their memoirs of their captivity, and histories of the event were published, rich with 
gruesome, horrific drama and sensationalism. Collective memories were already being 
formulated and shaped, focused on the savagery of the American Indian, and the 
innocence of the white settlers. As demonstrated by the newspapers, those on the East 
Coast may have been able to acknowledge the problems with the system, but those in the 
territories could not move past the violence. 
Only a few short years later in 1865, sign painter John Stevens created the first 
panorama of the Dakota War. Stevens placed the „savage‟ Indian at the forefront of his 
artistic work. Originally from Utica, New York, Stevens moved to Rochester Minnesota 
in the 1850s, and heard many firsthand accounts of the uprising. It is unknown why he 
reportedly created the panorama a month after the uprising began, but between the years 
of 1865 and 1878, Stevens painted approximately five versions of the uprising.
119
 There 
may have been an earlier version of Stevens‟ panorama in 1865 that he sold to a private 
buyer, but the first one for public use appeared in 1868. Stevens traveled through 
Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois, stopping at small towns and cities, where he set 
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up his panorama at schoolhouses and town halls. For as little as fifty cents one could 
witness Stevens‟ moving canvas. Entitled “The Panorama of the Indian Massacre of 1862 
and the Black Hills,” more commonly known now as the Dakota War Panorama, the 
painted canvas was six feet wide and two-hundred and twenty-two feet long, with thirty-
six colored scenes. The showing of the piece was very popular, Stevens narrated while 
musicians played. Someone operated the hand crank, moving the wooden mechanical 
frame, letting the dramatic scene unfold in front of the audience. Stevens‟ work depicted 
scenes from the massacre, settlers fleeing for their lives, and the hanging. In all phases he 
highlighted the savagery of the American Indian while exaggerating the innocence of 
white settlers.
120
 Below is a scene from one of Stevens‟ panoramas, titled “Slaughter 
Slough,” depicting a group of settlers hiding in a grassy field while being surrounded by 
the approaching Indians. Two of the men are loading their muskets but they will no doubt 
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Stevens and his assistants were not the only ones who painted a panorama 
depicting the uprising; there are several other panoramas from the late nineteenth century 
with it as its subject matter as well. Two of Stevens‟ creations survive today, both in 
museums.
121
 Stevens‟ work demonstrates that from the outset the settlers took control of 
how they wished to remember the uprising, and how they rationalized such 
unprecedented acts of violence. By focusing on the violence and the Indians‟ savagery 
towards them, the settlers were better able to handle such a traumatic event. They had 
done nothing wrong, nothing deserving of a blood bath, but since the Dakota were little 
more than savage beasts, the settlers did not need further cause for the uprising. 
The first monument dedicated to the events of the Dakota War appeared in 
September 1878, southwest of Litchfield, Minnesota at a local church, in honor of those 
killed at Acton. Marked with a granite stone, the monument served as a mass grave for 
the deceased.
122
 The state of Minnesota erected a monument in 1891 in New Ulm titled 
“Guardians of the Frontier” which depicts battle scenes in relief form along the base of 
the obelisk. Another monument also appeared in 1899 honoring six Dakota men who 
saved the lives of settlers in the uprising. In 1909 a stone monument was placed at 
Baker‟s Farm where the uprising first began with those four young Indian men who 
found the unfortunate farmer‟s eggs. 
123
 
The white population erected these early monuments in the late nineteenth 
century were for the white population‟s benefit. Indeed, they did not honor or remember 
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the Dakota. The 1899 monument acknowledging the six Dakota men who helped white 
settlers, does not portray the Indian men as American Indians but as Indians who did not 
give into the „savagery‟ of their fellow tribesmen and emulated the „civilized‟ 
characteristics of the white population. The only reason the Indians were mentioned at all 
is because they assisted whites in the uprising. As with the newspaper accounts and 
Stevens‟ panorama, the settlers actively chose to remember themselves as innocent 
victims in the wake of the Dakota‟s „savage‟s rage. The turn of the century however saw 
the arrival of the Dakota as Dakota in memorialization of the uprising.    
There was an 8500 pound granite monument placed in the town of Mankato in 
1912 at the site of the hanging, but it has since gone missing. The monument was simply 
engraved with the phrase: “Here were hanged 38 Sioux Indians,” with the date of 
December 26, 1862. The marker was removed from downtown Mankato in 1971 and 
reappeared in the 19902 in a a storage yard which was the last time anyone saw it. There 
are no records as to where it finally rests today or what prompted its removal. No 
documents indicate why the monument was removed. There is a disturbing lack of 
evidence regarding the monument. The Dakota found the monument especially offensive 
and one interviewed Dakota woman, seventy-one year old, Vernell Wabasha, referred to 
it simply as the “derogatory rock.” Wabasha claims to know where the marker is, but 
refuses to say where because it does not need to be seen.
124
  
 This missing monument was as a turning point in the memorialization process. 
For the first time the Dakota were remembered as individual actors, not as Indians with 
„civilized‟ characteristics. The monument represented the arrival of the Dakota in the 
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community‟s historical memory. It may be considered offensive and it may indeed shed a 
negative light on the Indian community, but at least the Dakota were now seen with 
individual agency. The Dakota War is a clearly apart of Minnesota‟s history and local 
communities struggle in regards to how the event should be remembered by the public. 
Throughout the twentieth century Minnesota citizens continued to memorialize the 
uprising in various ways in addition to stone monuments.  
The Minnesota Historical Society (MHS) purchased the only surviving Lower 
Agency building, a stone warehouse, in 1967 and beginning in the 1970s, the MSH has 
presented museum exhibits on the Dakota uprising for the public‟s consumption. Markers 
have been placed at the Redwood Ferry site where many settlers were able to escape at 
the beginning of the uprising; one of the markers honors the unknown ferryman who gave 
his life helping others across the river. West of New Ulm at Milford, the state erected a 
stone monument honoring the fifty-two settlers who died at the hands of the warring 
Dakota. There is also a granite obelisk at Wood Lake, where the final battle occurred 
between Sibley‟s men and the unprepared Indians. Part of the area has been declared a 
state park. At Camp Release where many white captives were released, a fifty-one foot 
tall stone monument stands in remembrance of the event. 
125
 The monuments no doubt 
helped with the healing process. 
Emotions still rang strong against the Dakota nation decades later. The Dakota 
were equally scarred by the events of 1862; it was not until the 1970s following the Civil 
Rights movement that the Dakota implanted their own methods of remembrance. In 1972, 
the Dakota held their first Mahkato Memorial Wacipi or pow-wow to honor the thirty-
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eight men hung at Mankato. Originally held at Sibley Park at Mankato, the Wacipi was 
attended only by Dakota members at first, with approximately two thousand tribesmen 
participating. The photograph below is of the first pow-wow. It was intended only to be a 
onetime event; however, it evolved into an annual commemorative and reconciliatory 
event. Attendees at the Wacipi claimed thirty-eight eagles could be seen flying over the 













 The city of Mankato dedicated a tract of land to the Dakota Nation in 1980 that 
once belonged to the Dakota before they were expelled from Minnesota. The land now 
known as “Land O Memories Park” or the “Dakota Wokiksuye Makoce Park,” was the 
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original meeting place for many traditional Dakota ceremonies and gatherings. It became 
the permanent home of the annual Wacipi where it gained increased popularity, higher 
attendance rates, and community support. Hundreds attend each year, both whites and 
American Indians alike, and support for the event comes primarily from the community 
and private sponsors. In addition to vendors, there is a dance competition and a 
drumming circle. Held every year around Labor Day, the Mahkato Memorial Wacipi is 
celebrating its fortieth anniversary.
127
 There is a Birch Coulee pow-wow that which is 
also held in September, but it does not promote reconciliation, rather it honors only the 
memory of the executed men. There is much less known about this event compared to the 
Mahkato Memorial Wacipi.  
The turning point between white and American Indian relations began in 1987, 
the 125
th
 anniversary of the uprising, when Vine Deloria, J.r, American Indian activist, 
challenged Minnesota to promote and encourage reconciliation during his key note 
speech at the Minneapolis Treaty Symposium. Later that year, Minnesota Governor Rudy 
Perpich verbally declared a “Year of Reconciliation” for the state. On December 26 1987 
the state unveiled a new monument dedicated to the Dakota, simply titled the “Winter 
Warrior.” That year Dakota exiles from Canada began to return to Minnesota for the 
pow-wows, many for the first time in generations. One Dakota tribesman interviewed in 
1987, eighty-one year old Eli Taylor, hoped the “Year of Reconciliation” would finally 
allow for healing: “Our parents were very much terrified, to the extent where they 
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wouldn‟t talk about it for  years and years and years…The Year of Reconciliation will 
help heal that wound.”
128
 
Since then there has been an increased attempt to preserve and honor the memory 
of the Dakota War by both the Dakota and white society to promote a better sense of 
unity between the two groups that have been at odds for centuries. In 1989, the Mahkato 
Memorial Wicipi began to include an educational program for local third graders. One 
day during September school children gathered at Land O Memories Park to interact with 
members of the Dakota Nation and learn about the Dakota culture. Those involved with 
the Wacipi claimed to have taught over twelve thousand school children and interested 
family members since the late 1980s.
129
 The photograph shown below is of the 










 As time progressed the horrific deeds of the Dakota War and their memories have 
lessened. Oral histories from the Dakota and white settlers have been collected, and 
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preserved, but each generation has become progressively more detached from the event 
which defined their ancestors‟ lives. Today the emphasis is less on Indian‟s brutality and 
is centered on the government‟s role that catalyzed the Dakota to action. Increasingly, the 
executed men are seen with honor and respect, not as murderous criminals. Some 
American Indian groups refer to the execution as a mass murder.   
 American Indian artist, Edgar Heap Of Birds, did his best in 1990 to encourage 
the memorialization of the thirty-eight executed Dakota by creating a public modern art 
project, featured along the Mississippi River in Minneapolis. Heap Of Birds produced 
forty aluminum signs like the one depicted below which listed the names of each Dakota 
man executed. The artist included two other men who were later hanged under the orders 
of President Andrew Johnson. These signs, known as the “Building Minnesota” exhibit, 
were hung along the river so it could be seen by everyday people. Heap of Birds did not 
want it to be shown in a museum where the exposure would be limited he said interview. 
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 Honoring their executed tribesmen became much easier in 1997 when the Dakota 
Nation‟s long search for the remains of one of the men produced results. Originally the 
men were buried in a mass grave however scientists, reportedly, later claimed the bodies 
for scientific research. It is also believed that settlers dug up the bodies to use them as 
souvenirs. In the late 1990s the Mayo clinic admitted to having the skull of one of the 
men, Cut Nose or Mahpi‟ ya Ainazin, and a piece of his skin. As according to the Native 
American Grave Repatriation Act his remains were returned to the Dakota, and in May 
1998 they ceremonially buried him. Since then the Dakota have been able to perform 
more healing ceremonies. The remains of Cut Nose, such as they are, are the only 
surviving remains of the executed Dakota. It is unknown what happened to the rest of his 
body or the other men.
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The year 2012 marks the 150
th
 anniversary of the Dakota War. The Brown 
County Historical Society (BCHS) has already created a committee for the occasion as 
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well as a website. Despite early claims in 2009 of including the Dakota community and 
perspective in the event, the current website has no mention of the Dakota Nation‟s 
involvement. It is unknown if that is simply because the Dakota do not want to participate 
or if the BCHS did not include them in the decision making process. Currently the 
Dakota are noticeably absent from the planned events. The website lists a variety of 
events: walking tours, round table discussions, lectures, film showings, a concert, a 
luncheon and banquets, and rededication ceremonies for several of the existing 
monuments. The BCHS is also hoping to have a new book published for the event, and a 
corresponding book signing event on the anniversary.
132
 
 The monuments erected in the late nineteenth and mid twentieth centuries were 
sponsored by the white community for the white people‟s benefit, but the public memory 
has gradually changed to include the Dakota‟s perspective. Metaphorically similar to the 
Dakota‟s fight for independence in August 1862, the Dakota Nation has been engaged in 
an ongoing battle for a voice in the memorialization of the Dakota War. Originally the 
white citizens controlled the memory and used various forms of media to honor white 
victims and victories, but with the passage of time as future generations became more 
removed from the uprising‟s atrocities, the Dakota slowly infiltrated the white dominated 
memorialization.  
 The turning point in this process of equal representation in memory began with 
the missing monument of 1912 and culminated in 1972 with the first Mahkato Memorial 
Wacipi. Over one hundred years later, the Dakota were able to demand a voice in the 
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public memory. Since then, various tribe members have tried to shape the 
memorialization to incorporate the government‟s responsibility in the uprising. No longer 
are whites the only innocent victims, the Dakota are frequently seen in the same light. 
After the uprising, the Dakota were not physically able to have an active role in the 
shaping of memory but in the hundred and fifty years since, tribal pride and strength have 
taken the place of silence. Today the public memory is more truthful and all 
encompassing than it was in 1865 with Stevens‟ panorama or even with the early 
monuments. The Dakota believe that it will take seven generations before healing and 
peace could occur between Minnesota and the Indian Nation, and with the seventh 
generation upon us, there is hope that there can finally be equality and harmony in both 
the representation and in the memory of the Dakota War.  
*** 
In retrospect, the Dakota War could have been easily prevented. If those four 
young men had not found that egg nest, maybe they never would have confronted the 
farmer. If the prior treaties with the Dakota had been fairer, or if the Indian agents had 
been concerned with their charges‟ welfare and not with lining their own pockets, 
perhaps the Dakota would not have felt unprecedented violence was their only way to 
gain a better life for themselves. If the traders had charged less inflated prices the Dakota 
might not have existed in a continual cycle of debt and poverty, living hand to month. If 
the government had punished Inkpaduta in the Spirit Lake Massacre, maybe the Dakota 
would have given more thought to the consequences of rising against the whites in such a 
violent manner. If the American Civil War had not occurred, the yearly annuity payments 




Even with the war on, had Galbraith handed out more provisions, the Indians might have 
been convinced to wait peacefully until the annuity payments did arrive. If people had 
reacted differently when the young men broke down the warehouse door, and recognized 
the dangerous situation brewing, perhaps the initial outbreak could been contained or 
even prevented in its entirety. 
 But none of these “what ifs” happened. So many lives could have been saved if 
only one action had been different. The situation between the Dakota and the United 
States rapidly degenerated in a downward spiral which ended in a violent, bloody clash 
that both sides were powerless to stop. Both Minnesota and the Dakota Nation were 
caught up in the moment, each unwilling to admit defeat. Although the Dakota believed, 
at least in the beginning, they could have won a war against the whites, the rest of the 
world knew it was only a matter of time before the rebellion would be squashed and the 
Indians punished for their attempt to gain control of their own fate. Thirty-eight Dakota 
men personally paid for the uprising with their lives and several hundred settlers died. 
Despite his unrelenting focus on the war in the South, President Lincoln became caught 
in the middle. He did not want to become involved, but he did not have a choice when the 
military tribunal could not move past their prejudices and need for revenge. No stranger 
to the possible violence from American Indians, Lincoln was forced to find a compromise 
with his natural humanitarianism and need to find good in people, with Minnesota‟s loud 
demands for blood retribution. The president valued human life which is probably what 
encouraged him to favor clemency as he considered the fate of three-hundred and three 
condemned Dakota. Lincoln was wholly invested in the Civil War; he wanted desperately 




system. No doubt he resented the intrusion of the Dakota War, but his compassionate 
nature forced him to make the fairest decision possible. Minnesotans demonstrated a 
lasting need for revenge on the Dakota people that would take much more than a mass 
execution to sate. 
 The uprising itself lasted a little over a month, but the effects of it lasted well into 
the twenty-first century. An unknown number of settlers died on the Minnesota frontier 
while the Dakota lost many tribe members in Fort Snelling and during relocation. Settlers 
eventually returned to their homes and began their lives, however the Indians no longer 
had their tribal home. The land which they had inhabited for over a century was taken 
away from them as punishment and the Dakota were banished to the west, to new lands 
which held no cultural or religious meaning to them whatsoever. Some Dakota did stay in 
Minnesota, but they faced much hatred from the white population. 
 The hatred remained between the groups for decades. As can be seen in the media 
and artwork from the late nineteenth century, the white population focused solely on the 
„savagery‟ of the American Indian. The monuments erected in honor of the Dakota War 
did not acknowledge the Indians until well into the twentieth century; they memorialized 
instead white victimization. It took many decades before the Dakota felt strong enough to 
participate in honoring their own ancestors, however now both Minnesota and the Dakota 
Nation work together to commemorate the anniversary of the uprising. Now the focus is 
on the government‟s role in instigating the event and not on the barbarous acts. 
 Very little good has come out of the Dakota War. It is not one of the historical 
events in which the ends justified the means or where a colossal change occurred that 




large wound opened between the Indian population and the whites which still lingers 
today, over a century and a half later. The Dakota War did turn attention onto the Indian 
reservation system which prompted eventual change, but with the Civil War demanding 
all of the country‟s attention, the change was a long time in coming. Both the white 

























1). 1878 Acton Monument        2).  1891 Guardians of the Frontier 
 
http://www.rrcnet.org/~historic/Acton.htm                         http://www.newulm.com/visitors-
community/attractions/ 
3). 1899 Monument Honoring the Loyal Dakota 4).1909 Baker‟s Farm Monument 
   
 http://mnprairieroots.wordpress.com/2010/07/page/2/             
     http://www.plainsart.org/learnonline/exhibits/show/david-  









5.). Missing Monument from 1912 
        6). Milford Monument  
            
 












      http://www.rrcnet.org/~historic/Milford.html 
http://mankatofreepress.com/local/x519254252/Students-search-for-missing-
monument?keyword=secondarystory 



















http://www.globe-hoppers.com/sioux-indian.html            













































Books and Articles 
Flandrau, Charles E. “The Ink-pa-du-ta Massacre of 1857,” in Minnesota Historical 
 Collections, vol. 3. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1880. 
Nicolay, John G. and John Hay. Abraham Lincoln: A History. New York: The Century 
 Co, 1890. 
 
Riggs, Stephen. Tah-koo wah-kań or The Gospel Among the Dakota. Boston: 
 Congressional Sabbath-School and Publishing Society, 1869.  
 
Government Documents 
American State Papers, I: 9. 2 July 1788. 
 <http://gbl.indiana.edu/ethnohistory/archives/dockett_317/317_36a.html> 
 (accessed 4  March  2011). 
Board of Commissioners. Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars: 1861-1865. St. Paul: 
 Pioneer Press Company, 1891.  
Indian Removal Act. 1830. <http://www.civics- 
 online.org/library/formatted/texts/indian_act.html> (accessed 4 March 2011).  
 
Knox, Henry. Report on the Northwestern Indians.15 June 1789. American State Papers: 
 Indian  Affairs, I: 13-14  
 <http://pages.uoregon.edu/mjdennis/courses/hist469_Knox.htm> (accessed 4 
 March  2011).  
War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series 1. 
 Vol. 13. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.  
 
 “Records of Selected Cases Decided by the Military Commission Sitting in Minnesota.” 
 <http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/dakota/cases.html> (accessed 2 
 March  2011).  
 
Speeches 
Lincoln, Abraham. “Speech in the House of Representatives.” 27 July 1848. 
 <http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/diary/002725.asp> (accessed 10 October  




Little Crow. “Taoyateduta Is Not a Coward.” Minnesota History 38, no. 3 (September 
 1962):115.  
Oral Histories, and Interviews 
 
Big Eagle.“Through Dakota Eyes: Narrative Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 
 1862.” Ed. Gary Clayton Anderson and Alan R. Woolworth. St. Paul: Minnesota 
 Historical Society Press, 1988.  
 
Heap Of Birds, Edgar. “Sculpture: Edgar Heap Of Birds.” Interview by John LeKay 
 <http://www.heyokamagazine.com/HEYOKA.3.SCULPT.EDGAR.htm> 
 (accessed 30  March 2011).  
Letters and Memoirs 
Gardner, Abbie. History of the Spirit Lake Massacre and Captivity of Miss Abbie 
 Gardner. Des Moines: Iowa Print Company, 1885. 
 
Knox, Henry. Letter to George Washington. 7 July 1789. Gilder Lehrman Collection
 <http://www.pbs.org/georgewashington/collection/pres_1789jul7.html> (accessed 
 4 March 2011). 
 
Lincoln, Abraham. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basley. New 
 Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953.  
 
Prescott, Philander. The Recollections of Philander Prescott: Frontiersman of the Old 
 Northwest, 1819 – 1862 ed. Donald Dean Parker. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
 Press, 1966. 
Riggs, Martha T. “Letter to Cincinnati Christian Herald.” In Mary and I, Forty Years with 
 the Sioux by Stephen Riggs.Williamstown: Corner House Massachusetts, 1880. 
 
Riggs, Stephen. Mary and I: Forty Years with the Sioux. Williamstown: Corner House 
  Publishers, 1880 
 
Whipple, Bishop Henry Benjamin. “Report to President Lincoln.”In North Star Country 
 by Meridel Le Sueur. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1945. 
Newspaper Articles 
 
Cincinnati Daily Enquirer. August 1862.  





Dakota Republican. November 1862, January 1863.  
Daily Picayune. September, November, December 1862.  
Daily Richmond Enquirer. December 1862. 
 
Harpers Weekly. December 1862, January 1863. 
Liberty Tribune. August 1862. 
New Hampshire Patriot and Gazette. November, December 1862. 
 
The New York Daily Tribune. September, December 1862. 
New York Times. August, September, November, December 1862.  
Philadelphia Enquirer.  August, November 1862. 
Portland Daily Advertiser. November, December 1862. 
 
The Sun. August, September, October, November, December 1862. 
Vermont Phoenix. December 1862. 
Weekly Dakotian. November, December 1862, January 1863.  
Wisconsin Chief. September 1862. 
Wisconsin Patriot. August, September 1862.  
Wisconsin Daily Patriot. August 1862. 
 
Websites 
Brown County Historical Society.“150
th
 Anniversary of the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862: 
 Brown  County, Minnesota.” 
 <http://www.browncountydakotawarcommemoration.com/IN_THE_NEWS.php> 













Babcock, Willoughyby M.“Minnesota‟s Indian War.” Minnesota’s Indian War 38, no.3 
 (September 1962): 93-98.  
Carley, Kenneth. “As Red Men Viewed it: Three Indian Accounts of the 
 Uprising.”Minnesota History 38, no. 3 (Spring 1962): 126-149. 
 
Carol, Chomsky. “The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice.” 
 in Stanford Law Review 43, no. 1 (November 1990 ): 13-98. 
Chaput, Donald. “Generals, Indian Agents, Politicians: The Doolittle Survey of 
 1865.”Western Historical Quarterly 3, no. 3. July 1979. 
Dowlin, Sheryl and Bruce Dowlin. “Healing History‟s Wounds: Reconciling 
 Communication Efforts to Build Community Between Minnesota Dakota (Sioux) 
 and Non Dakota Peoples.” Peace and Change 27, no. 2 ( July 2002): 412-436. 
Fridley, Russell W. “Charles E. Flandrau: Attorney at War.” Minnesota History 38, no. 4 
 (1962 September): 116-125. 
 
Gluek, Alvin C. Jr.“The Sioux Uprising: A Problem in International Relations.” 
 Minnesota History 34, no. 8 (Winter 1955): 317-324. 
 
Heilbron, Bertha L.“Documentary Panorama.” Minnesota History Magazine ( March 
 1949):14-23. 
Henig, Gerald T. and Gerald S. Henig. “A Neglected Cause of the Sioux Uprising.” 
 Minnesota History 45, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 107-110. 
 
Jackson, Alfred Augustus. “Abraham Lincoln in the Black Hawk War.”1898. 
 <http://content.wisconsinhistory.org/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/whc&CI
 SOPTR=6741&CISOSHOW=6282> (accessed 10 October 2010): 118-136. 
 
Newspaper Articles 
The Free Press. September 1987, May 2006, December 2006 .   
 








Bell, John. American Puppet Modernism: Essays on the Material World in Performance. 
 New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
Carely, Kenneth. The Dakota War of 1862. St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 
 1976.  
 
Danziger, Edmund Jefferson Jr., Indians and Bureaucrats: Administrating the 
 Reservation Policy During the Civil War. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
 1974. 
 
Ellis, Richard N. General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy. Albuquerque: University of New 
 Mexico Press, 1970.  
 
Etulain, Richard E. “Abraham Lincoln and the Trans-Mississippi American West: An 
 Introductory Overview,” in Lincoln Looks West: From the Mississippi to the 
 Pacific, ed. Richard W. Etulain, 1-67. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
 Press, 2010.  
Herbert, David Donald. Lincoln . New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.  
Jones, Evan. The Minnesota: Forgotten River. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
 1962.  
Le Sueur, Meridel. North Star Country. New York: Dell, Sloan & Pearce, 1945.  
Meyer, Roy W. History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian Policy on Trial. 
 Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.  
 
Nichols, David A. Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and Politics. Columbia: 
 University of Columbia Press, 1978.  
 
 Oehler, C.M. The Great Sioux Uprising. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.  
 
Palmquist, Peter E. and Thomas R. Kailbourn. Pioneer Photographs From the 
 Mississippi to the Continental Divide: A Biographical Discovery, 1839 – 
 1865.Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.  
 
Pearce, Roy Harvey. The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of 




Sandburg, Carl. Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the War Years. New York: 
 Harcourt Inc, 1982.  
Seymour, Flora Warren. Indian Agents of the Old Frontier. New York: Octagon Books, 
 1975.  
Sheehan, Bernard W. Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American 
 Indian.Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973.  
Shortridge, Porter Wilson. The Transition of a Typical Frontier. Menasha: George Banta  
Publishing Company, 1922.  
 
Shultz, Duane. Over the Earth I Come: The Great Sioux Uprising of 1862. New York: St.
 Martin‟s Press, 1992.  
 
Teakle, Thomas. The Spirit Lake Massacre. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 
 1918. 
Conference Papers – Published 
Viola, Herman. “Lincoln and the Indians.” Paper presented at the annual meeting for the 
 Lincoln Fellowship of Wisconsin, Madison, 1976.  
 
Conference Papers – Unpublished 
Dowlin, Sheryl and Bruce Dowlin. “The Dakota Conflict Remembered.” Paper Presented 
 at annual Northern Great Plains History Conference, Mankato, September 2000 
 <http://www.dowlinconsulting.com/images/%2700%20The%20Dakota%20Confl
 ict%20 Remembered.pdf> (accessed 30 March 2011).  
 
Websites 
Dowlin, Sheryl and Bruce Dowlin.“First Mahkato Memorial Wacipi.” 7 December 2008 
 <http://www.hmdb.org/Marker.asp?Marker=17506 > (accessed 30 March 2011).  
Mahkato Wacipi Club History.“Mahkato Wacipi Honoring the 38 Dakota,” 30 August 
 2010 <http://www.mahkatowacipi.org/History.htm> (accessed 30 March 2011). 
Walker Art Center. “Hachivi Edgar Heap of Birds, TA-TE' HDI-DA (WIND COMES 
 HOME), 1990.” 1 March 2009 < 
 http://www.artsconnected.org/resource/90608/hachivi-edgar- heap-of-birds-
 ta-te-hdi-da-wind-comes-home-1990> (accessed 30 March 2011). 
 
